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GROUNDWATER POLLUTION:
CASE LAW THEORIES FOR RELIEF
Nnam.N. DAvs*
One-quarter of the earth's supply of fresh water lies underground.'
Traditionally over the centuries shallow wells have tapped this groundwater
resource for domestic and livestock watering purposes. With the rise in
industrial technology the uses of groundwater have multiplied, the depth of
wells has increased, and the total withdrawals have increased. But the supply
of groundwater is not inexhaustible. Groundwater already is in chronic
shortage in many areas of the West where withdrawals exceed natural re-
charge by a significant amount; in effect, the groundwater is being "mined."
Use of groundwater for various purposes, in the humid eastern states, also
has been expanding rapidly in recent years, as local shortages of waters in
rivers, streams and lakes and pollution of those watercourses proliferate.
The East has experienced falling groundwater levels during droughts when
withdrawals exceeded natural recharge.
This situation can only worsen as the demands for groundwater use
increase. A congressional study in 1961 estimated that total daily water
requirements would exceed 700 billion gallons per day by 1980 and 1,000
billion gallons per day by 2000. Our total available water supply is approxi-
mately 515 billion gallons per day.2 At present 80 percent of the water used
in the United States comes from surface sources and the remainder from
underground sources. Because our usable groundwater supplies are three
times the size of our surface supplies,3 it is clear that much of the future
growth in water use must depend on groundwater.
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia. B.A., Haverford
College, 1959; LL.B., University of Wisconsin, 1963; S.J.D., University of
Wisconsin, 1972.
1. 24.88 percent of the total estimated volume of 33,016,084 million acre-feet, or 8,213,000 million acre-feet. It is a far larger amount than is contained in
fresh water lakes (101,000 million acre-feet-0.3 percent) and rivers (933 million
acre-feet-0.003 percent). W. AcxmEvrm_., & G. LoF, TECHNOLOGy N AMEmCAN
WATER DEVELOPMENT 11-13 (1959). A complete breakdown from that work is
presented in Davis, Wells and Streams: Relationship at Law, 37 Mo. L. REv. 189,
194 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Davis, Wells and Streams].
2. J. WmGHT, TaE CoMwnG WATER FAm n 20 (1966).
3. F. Moss, Trm WATER Crsis 33, 40 (1967).
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Pollution has the effect of reducing available water supplies. The dis-
charge of wastes into rivers, streams and lakes degrades their usability for
various consumptive and nonconsumptive uses. Pollution of groundwater
renders it less valuable for the same purposes. Pollution of groundwater has
been caused for centuries by privies, manure piles and cemeteries. In
modern times, privy-substitutes (cesspools and septic tanks) and industrial
wastes and spills are the most significant sources of pollution.
Some have advocated underground disposal as one method of getting
rid of industrial wastes. The earliest attempts to use this method involved
shallow sewage wells. A host of deeper, salt water disposal wells in oil
and gas fields have been developed over the past few decades. Such wells
involve either reinjection of salt water into existing salt water aquifers or
injection of it into oil and gas reservoirs as a secondary recovery technique.
lecently, interest is developing in the use of deep well injection of industrial
liquid wastes as an alternative to treatment and discharge of wastes into
surface watercourses. Well disposal obviates the cost of treating the wastes.
In 1969 there were 150 such industrial waste disposal wells in the United
States.4 This figure is expected to increase rapidly. At that time, refineries,
chemical plants and steel mills owned 82 percent of industrial liquid waste
disposal wells.0
Underground disposal of waste does not always prevent pollution. One
problem is that wastes are capable of migrating under natural forces. While
every attempt is usually made to discharge wastes into strata which are
separated from fresh water strata,0 that is not always effectively accom-
plished. Potable groundwater supplies have been polluted by waste injec-
tion operations.7 Salt water leaking along oil well casings and plugs8 and
4. Shipley, Deep-Well Injection of Liquid Wastes, in A. EITZE, JR.,
ENvinONmrNTAL LAw 4:143, 4:143 (2d ed. 1972), citing Evan & Bradford,
Under the Rug, ENvmoNmE=,, Oct. 1969, at 11.
5. Shipley, supra note 4, at 4:143, citing National Industrial Pollution
Control Council, Waste Disposal in Deep Wells 9 (Feb. 1971).
6. Shipley, supra note 3, at 4:144, citing Winer, The Disposal of Waste-
water Underground, INnusnuA ENGINMERING, Mar. 1967, at 21.
7. See Augustine v. Hinnen, 201 Kan. 710, 443 P.2d 354 (1968); Ballard
v. Tomlinson, 29 Ch. D. 115 (C.A. 1885), rev'g 26 Ch. D. 194 (1884). For a
thorough factual description of deep well injection of oil well salt water, see
Alliston v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 143 Kan. 327, 55 P.2d 896 (1936).
8. See H. W. Peerson Drilling Co. v. Scoggins, 261 Ala. 284, 74 So. 2d
450 (1954); Reiserer v. Murfin, 183 Kan. 597, 331 P.2d 313 (1958); Martin v.
Shell Petroleum Corp., 133 Kan. 124, 299 P. 261 (1931); Hall v. Galey, 126
Kan. 699, 271 P. 319 (1928);Wynn v. Wilson, 252 Ky. 352, 67 S.W.2d 483
(1934); Norman v. Greenland Drilling Co., 403 P.2d 507 (Okla. 1965); Sunray
Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. Tisdale, 366 P.2d 614 (Okla. 1961); Harper-Turner Oil
Co. v. Bridge, 311 P.2d 947 (Okla. 1957); Shell Oil Co. v. Blubaugh, 199 Okla.
353, 185 P.2d 959 (1947); Sheridan Oil Co. v. Wall, 187 Okla. 398, 103 P.2d
507 (1940); Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Blubaugh, 187 Okla. 198, 102 P.2d 163(1940); Schlictkrull v. Mellon-Pollock Oil Co. (No. 1), 301 Pa. 553, 152 A.
829 (1930); Collins v. Chartiers Valley Gas Co., 139 Pa. 111, 21 A. 147 (1891);
Collins v. Chartiers Valley Gas Co., 131 Pa. 143, 18 A. 1012 (1890). For an
excellent factual description of how an oil well is drilled and cased and the
producing strata fractured, see McCoy v. Cohen, 149 W.Va. 197, 140 S.E.2d
427 (1965).
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percolating from surface disposal pits9 is a significant hazard to ground-
water quality in many states.
This article will describe how the courts have utilized the common
law to deal with the groundwater pollution problem. I have attempted to
examine every groundwater pollution case reported in the United States,
England, Ireland, Scotland, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.10 All of
them, a total of 203, are listed in the Appendices. The purpose of this
article is to analyze those cases to determine what rule the courts tend to
use in particular kinds of groundwater pollution cases.
I. RuLis APPLICABLE TO PERCO ATING
GROUNDWATER POLLU.ION
The courts have evolved a body of rules for allocating groundwater
between conflicting users. Issues involving use, diversion and obstruction
of water in identifiable underground streams"1 are governed by the rules
which allocate water in surface watercourses: riparian rights in the East and
prior appropriation in the West.' 2 Conflicts involving use, diversion and
obstruction of percolating groundwater are governed by one of several
9. See O'Brien v. Primm, 243 Ark. 186, 419 S.W.2d 323 (1967); Phoenix
v. Graham, 349 Ill. App. 326, 110 N.E.2d 669 (1953); Polzin v. National Co-op.
Refinery Assn, 175 Kan. 531, 266 P.2d 293 (1954); Rusch v. Phillips Petroleum
Co., 163 Kan. 11, 180 P.2d 270 (1947); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Williams, 222
Miss. 538, 76 So. 2d 365 (1954); Crawford v. Yeatts, 395 S.W.2d 413 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1965); General Crude Oil Co. v. Aiken, 162 Tex. 104, 344 S.W.2d 668(1961), rev'g 335 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960); Brown v. Lundell, 162
Tex. 84, 344 S.W.2d 863 (1961), aff'g 334 S.W.2d 616 (Tex. Civ. A pp. 1960);
Geochemical Surveys v. Dietz, 340 S.W.2d 114 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960); Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Alexander, 291 S.W.2d 792 (Tex. Civ. App.), aff'd per curiam, 156 Tex.
455, 295 S.W.2d 901 (1956); Swan v. Adams, 23 Grant Ch. 220 (Ont. 1876).
For an excellent factual description of the mechanism by which oil well salt water
disposal pits pollute groundwater, see Pickens v. Harrison, 151 Tex. 562, 252
S.W.2d 575, modifying 246 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
10. See Table 1 in Appendix C infra. There were no groundwater pollution
cases in Ireland, Scotland, Australia, and New Zealand.
On the subject of this article, see also 3 R.E. CLAMu, WATER AND WATER
Rcmrs § 214 (1967); Knodell, Liability for Pollution of Surface and Under-
ground Waters, 12 RocKY MT. MINERAL L. INsTIT. 88, 52-57 (1967); Comment,
Groundwater Pollution in the Western States-Private Remedies and Federal and
State Legislation, 8 LAND & WATER L. Rlv. 537 (1973); Comment, Liability of
Landowner for Pollution of Percolating Waters, 39 MARQ. L. REv. 119 (1955);
Annot., 38 A.L.R.2d 1265 (1954).
11. Identifiable underground streams are those which are ascertainable from
the surface by ordinary men without making excavations for the purpose of
locating it. Typically a line of different vegetation, a series of potholes, a linear
wet area, etc., are considered evidence of an underground stream. See note 115
and accompanying text infra.
12. Those two bodies of surface watercourse allocation law are discussed
in many works on water rights law. I have summarized them in Davis, Wells
and Streams 199-200.
1974]
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allocation rules. These are absolute ownership,13 "reasonable use,"' 4 eastern
correlative rights,15 western "correlative rights" (common pool), 16 and
prior appropriation.' 7
One would expect that the same rules which govern use, diversion and
obstruction would govern pollution of groundwater since the practical con-
sequences of pollution are no different than those of diversion or obstruction.
In both cases, the neighboring landowner is deprived of his use of the
groundwater. But such is not the case. In the vast majority of cases involving
pollution of percolating groundwater either the law of negligence or the
law of private nuisance governs. Of the 203 cases involving pollution of
percolating groundwater in the United States, England and Canada, 75
cases utilized negligence law, 3 utilized public nuisance law, 84 utilized
private nuisance law, 4 cases adopted the Restatement rule, 20 cases adopted
a strict liability standard, and 15 cases did not specify what rule was being
followed. Only 2 cases followed one of the percolating groundwater alloca-
13. The landowner may make any use of the percolating groundwater he
chooses on or off the land where the well is located or may make any use of his
land which affects the movement of groundwater, without incurring liability for
any resulting injury to his neighbor's percolating groundwater supply. Id. at 202.
14. The landowner is immune from liability if he uses the percolating
groundwater on the land where the well is located and the use is reasonable
per se. He is also immune if his use of the land affecting the percolating ground-
water is per se reasonable. Id.
15. The landowner may make reasonable use of the percolating groundwater
on the overlying land and may make reasonable use of the land which affects
the movement of the groundwater. What is a reasonable use is determined by
balancing the equities of the competing users for the purposes of determining
both liability andrelief. Id.
16. Where users over a common aquifer are taking out more groundwater
than the annual natural recharge, all the users must proportionately cut back
their use until withdrawal equals recharge. Id. at 203.
17. The first landowner to establish a right to divert water by posting or
giving notice of intent to divert can use that water for beneficial uses, and he will
be the last person cut off in times of scarcity. Later diverters are similarly cut
off in inverse order of their priority dates. This rule for surface watercourses is
applied to percolating groundwater when it is proven to be a tributary to a stream
or part of its subflow or subsurface support. Id. at 204.
For a further discussion of the various rules for allocating groundwater see
Thomas, Water Law-Groundwater Rights in Missouri-A Need for Clarification,
37 Mo. L. Rrv. 357 (1972), which discussed the distinction between the so-
called "reasonable use" rule and the eastern correlative rights rule.
States following the absolute ownership, "reasonable use," and eastern
correlative rights rules are listed, with representative citations, in Davis, Wells
and Streams 238-34.
See generally 6A AMERIcAN LAw OF PROPERYT § 28.65 (A. J. Casner ed.
1954); W. HuTcimns, SELECTED PROBLEMS IN THm LAW OF WATER RIGHTS IN
THE WEST 151-66 (U.S. Dep't Agric. Misc. Pub. No. 418, 1942, reprint 1971); F.
MALONEY, S. PLACGER & F. BAr.nwnj, WATER LAw AND ADmINISTRATION: THE
FLonDrA EXPERIENCE 150-58 (1968); Cross, Ground Waters in the Southeastern
States, 5 S.C.L.Q. 149 (1952); Ellis, Water Law in Eastern United States, 18
J. SOIL & WATER CONSERV. 19 (1963); Hanks & Hanks, The Law of Water in New
[Vol. 39
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tion rules.18 This is true even though many of the cases expressly aclmowl-
edge that the allocation rules govern use, diversion and obstruction situa-
tions.' 9 Of course, since a majority of eastern cases involving pollution of
surface watercourses apply public and private nuisance law rather than
riparian rights rules,20 it is not surprising that courts utilize nuisance law in
the percolating groundwater pollution situation as well.
One explanation of why the. courts follow relatively strict negligence or
nuisance theories rather than the percolating groundwater allocation rules
in pollution situations is that the courts are less sympathetic to a landowner
who pollutes percolating groundwater than they are to one who diverts it
to the injury of his neighbor. This attitude is expressed by courts which have
stated that a landowner has no right to poison percolating groundwater so
that when it reaches his neighbor's land the neighbor cannot use it,2 1 a well
owner has the right to take percolating groundwater in its natural state and
from its natural source,2 2 and a landowner has no right to destroy the
neighboring owner's rights to appropriate percolating groundwater by con-
taminating the source.23 The application of negligence or nuisance law
manifests this sympathy insofar as negligence law permits the granting of
relief in many pollution situations and nuisance law permits the granting of
relief in most pollution situations, whereas the two percolating groundwater
allocation rules (the absolute ownership rule and the reasonable use rule)
prevalent outside the western prior appropriation states deny relief in most
pollution situations. For instance, the absolute ownership rules would give
Jersey: Groundwater, 24 RtrrGEns L. REv. 621 (1970); Maloney & Plager,
Florida's Ground Water: Legal Problems in Managing a Precious Resource, 21
U. MLAff L. REv. 751 (1967); Harnsberger, Nebraska Ground Water Problems,
42 NEB. L. REv. 721 (1963); Comment, The Law of Underground Water; A Half-
Century of Huber v. Merkel, 1953 Wis. L. Bsv. 491; Annots. 29 A.L.R.2d 1354(1953), 109 A.L.R. 395 (1937), 55 A.L.R. 1385 (1928).
18. See Table 1 in Appendix C infra.
The tentative revision to the REsTATEmNT OF ToRTs is based on the supposi-
tion that percolating groundwater allocation rules will not be followed in pollution
cases and that the liability will be imposed only on the basis of nuisance, trespass,
negligence or abnormally dangerous conduct. RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TOnTS
§ 849 (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971).
19. See cases cited note 31 infra.
20. Out of 445 surface watercourse pollution cases in American jurisdictions
recognizing riparian rights, 233 cases applied private nuisance law, 75 cases
applied public nuisance law and 137 cases applied riparian rights law. Davis,
Theories of Water Pollution Litigation, 1971 Wis. L. REv. 738, 742-43, (reprinted
1972 ENVRmoN. L. REV. 237, 1972 CoRPoRATE CoUNsEL's AN~uAL 839) [herein-
after cited as Davis, Water Pollution Litigation]. A comparison was not made of
surface watercourse pollution cases choosing between nuisance law and prior
appropriation law in the western prior appropriation jurisdictions.
21. Kinnaird v. Standard Oil Co., 89 Ky. 468, 474, 12 S.W. 937, 939 (1890);
Bassett v. Osborn, 23 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 342, 347, 84 Ohio C.C. Dec. 284 (1912).
22. Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Merritt, 332 P.2d 677, 685 (Okla. 1958);
Danciger Oil & Ref. Co. v. Donahey, 238 P.2d 308, 313 (Okla. 1951); Cities
Serv. Gas Co. v. Eggers, 186 Okla. 466, 469, 98 P.2d 1114, 1117 (1940).
23. Ballard v. Tomlinson, 29 Ch. D. 115, 121 (C.A. 1885).
1974]
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almost a complete immunity to polluters by permitting landowners to make
any use or diversion of percolating groundwater or to make any use of land
affecting or obstructing percolating groundwater, regardless of the conse-
quences on his neighbor's percolating groundwater supply. One reason often
given for this latter rule is that, since the landowner cannot ascertain in
advance what the consequences of his activity will be because the movement
of percolating groundwater is not apparent or readily ascertainable,24 it is
therefore not fair to impose a liability upon him.25 It is argued that to impose
a doctrine of correlative rights under those circumstances would deter
economic development.2 -0
The second main eastern groundwater rule, the "reasonable use" rule,
immunizes the landowner from liability wherever he disturbs groundwater
on that land.27 The only major exceptions to the substantially unrestricted
24. See, e.g., Swift & Co. v. Peoples Coal & Gas Co., 121 Conn. 579, 586,
186 A. 629, 632 (1936); Brown & Bros. v. Illius, 27 Conn. 84, 94 (1858); Tampa
Waterworks Co. v. Cline, 37 Fla. 586, 600, 20 So. 780, 783-84 (1896); Green-
castle v. Hazelbtt, 23 Ind. 186, 188-89 (1864); Upjohn v. Board of Health of
Richland, 46 Mich. 542, 549, 9 N.W. 845, 848 (1881); Beatrice Gas Co. v.
Thomas, 41 Neb. 662, 667-69, 59 N.W. 925, 927 (1894); Phillips v. Sun Oil Co.,
807 N.Y. 328, 830-31, 121 N.E.2d 249, 250 (1954); Thompson v. Board of
Educ., 124 Misc. 840, 842, 209 N.Y.S. 362, 864 (Sup. Ct. 1925); Dillon v. Acme
Oil Co., 49 Hun 565, 568-69, 2 N.Y.S. 289, 290-91 (Sup. Ct. 1888); Rose v.
Socony-Vacuum Corp., 54 R.I. 411, 417-18, 173 A. 627, 680 (1934); Farb v.
Theis, 250 S.W. 290, 292 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928); Texas Co. v. Giddings, 148
S.W. 1142, 1144 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912); Hodgkinson v. Ennor, 4 B. & S. 229,
122 Eng. Rep. 446, 450 (Q.B. 1863) (per Cockburn, C.J.); Ballard v. Tomlinson,
29 Ch. D. 115, 120-21, 123, 125-26 (C.A. 1885).
See also 6A Amlmc LAWv OF PROPERTY § 28.65 (A.J. Casner ed. 1954);
RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF ToRTs Explanatory Notes § 858A at 152-53 (Tent.
Draft No. 17, 1971); RESTATEMENT OF TORTs § 832, comment d at 268, § 845,
comment b at 338 (1939); Davis, Wells and Streams 201-02; Ellis, supra note 17,
at 21; Hanks & Hanks, supra note 17, at 631-33; Maloney, Plager & Baldwin,
supra note 17, at 154-55; Maloney & Plager, supra note 17, at 767-68; Comment,
supra note 17, at 492-94; Thomas, supra note 17, at 359.
25. Phillips v. Sun Oil Co., 807 N.Y. 328, 331, 121 N.E.2d 249, 251 (1954).
See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 832, comment d at 268, § 845, comment b at 833
(1939).
26. Farb v. Theis, 250 S.W. 290, 292 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923).
27. In other words, the landowner cannot sell or transport the percolating
groundwater he diverts for use elsewhere. Where his surface uses are legitimate
he has as much protection under this rule as under the absolute ownership rule.
See, e.g., Gilmore v. Royal Salt Co., 84 Kan. 729, 781-32, 115 P. 541, 542 (1911);
United Fuel Gas Co. v. Sawyers, 259 S.W.2d 466, 468 (Ky. 1953); Bayer v.
Nello L. Teer Co., 256 N.C. 509, 516-19, 124 S.E.2d 552, 556-58 (1962);
Bassett v. Osborn, 23 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 342, 345-46, 34 Ohio C.C. Dec. 284
1912); Collins v. Chartiers Valley Gas Co., 139 Pa. 111, 123-23, 21 A. 147, 148
1891); Reinhart v. Lancaster Area Refuse Authority, 201 Pa. Super. 614, 621,
193 A.2d 670, 673 (1963).
See also 6A AMEnicAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 28.65 (A.J. Casner ed. 1954);
RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS Explanatory Notes § 858A at 158-54 (Tent.
Draft No. 17, 1971); Davis, Wells and Streams 202-03; Ellis, supra note 17, at
21; Hanks & Hanks, supra note 17, at 633-37; Maloney, Plager & Baldwin, supra
note 17, at 155-58; Maloney & Plager, supra note 17, at 768-70; Comment, supra
note 17, at 495-98; Thomas, supra note 17, at 360.
[Vol. 39
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right of capture permitted by those two rules are negligent activities28 and
activities engaged in after the landowner acquires both knowledge of the
movement of the percolating groundwater in question and of the probable
consequences of his activity.2 Recognizing that the groundwater allocation
rules would deny relief in most situations, one court expressly rejected the
application of the absolute ownership rule in pollution situations. 30 Many
cases have effected an alternative approach to the same end by applying
negligence or nuisance law in pollution situations despite their express
reaffirmation of the general applicability of the allocation rules.31 Thirteen
such cases have granted relief and fourteen have denied relief.32 By con-
trast, six cases have denied relief under absolute ownership 33 and three
cases have denied relief under the so-called "reasonable use" rule.34 No
cases have granted relief under those two rules.
Insofar as the eastern correlative rights rule allows recovery in many
pollution situations courts following that rule need not feel so compelled to
follow negligence or nuisance law. The eastern correlative rights rule applies
a comparative reasonableness test similar to that used in the modern reason-
28. See, e.g., Swift & Co. v. Peoples Coal & Gas Co., 121 Conn. 579, 586,
186 A. 629, 632-33 (1936); Upjohn v. Board of Health of Richland, 46 Mich.
542, 549, 9 N.W. 845, 848 (1881); Bayer v. Nello L. Teer Co., 256 N.C. 509,
519-20, 124 S.E.2d 552, 559 (1962); Collins v. Chartiers Valley Gas Co., 131 Pa.
143, 159-69, 18 A. 1012, 1013-14 (1890); Rose v. Socony-Vacuum Corp., 54
R.I. 411, 417-18, 173 A. 627, 630 (1984).
29. See cases cited note 58 infra.
30. Beatrice Gas Co. v. Thomas, 41 Neb. 662, 670-71, 59 N.W. 925, 928
(1894).
31. Negligence: See cases cited in Appendix B, Part B infra.
Nuisance: Bellevue Cemetery Co. v. McEvers, 169 Ala. 535, 53 So. 272 (1910)(Qle); Gilmore v. Royal Salt Co., 84 Kan. 729, 115 P. 541 (1911) (R3c);
United Fuel Gas Co. v. Sawyers, 259 S.W.2d 466 (Ky. 1953) (Gld); Kinnaird
v. Standard Oil Co., 89 Ky. 468, 12 S.W. 937 (1890) (Hl,3a); Beatrice Gas Co. v.
Thomas, 41 Neb. 662, 59 N.W. 925 (1894) (K1,3i*); Bassett v. Osborn, 23 Ohio
C.C.R. (n.s.) 342, 34 Ohio C.C. Dec. 284 (1912) (Alb); Farb v. Theis, 250 S.W.
290 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923) (Qli); Texas Co. v. Giddings, 148 S.W. 1142 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1912) (I1,3a); Paine & Co. Ltd. v. St. Neots Gas & Coke Co., [1939]
3 All E.R. 812 (C.A.), aff'g [1938] 4 All E.R. 592 (K.5a); British Am. Oil Co.
Ltd. v. Burrill, [1942] Que. K.B. 218 (C.A.) (J1,6a). Consult the Appendices for
the case codings, infra.
32. For cases granting relief, see cases coded a-c,* cited in note 31 supra.
For cases denying relief, see cases coded d-k. Id.
33. Brown & Bros. v. Illius, 27 Conn. 84 (1858); Greencastle v. Hazelett,
23 Ind. 186 (1864); Dillon v. Acme Oil Co., 49 Hun 565, 2 N.Y.S. 289 (Sup.
Ct. 1888); Easton v. State, 153 Misc. 895, 275 N.Y.S. 119 (Ct. Cl. 1934),
modified, 245 App. Div. 439, 283 N.Y.S. 809, aff'd mem., 271 N.Y. 507, 2
N.E.2d 669 (1936); Thompson v. Board of Educ., 124 Misc. 840, 209 N.Y.S.
362 (Sup. Ct. 1925); Rose v. Socony-Vacuum Corp., 54 R.I. 411, 173 A. 627
(1934).
34. United Fuel Gas Co. v. Sawyers, 259 S.W.2d 466 (Ky. 1953); Bayer v.
Nello L. Teer Co., 256 N.C. 509, 124 S.E.2d 552 (1962); Eidemiller v. Keystone
Coal & Coke Co., 15 Pa. D. & C. 759, 17 West. 157 (C.P. 1930).
1974]
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able use formulation of the riparian rights doctrine.35 Negligence and the
nuisance effects of groundwater pollution normally would be two of the
several factors considered by the courts under that rule. Therefore, their
application need not be considered exceptions to the general allocation rule.
However, only a few jurisdictions have adopted the eastern correlative
rights rule.30 Accordingly, its application to pollution situations is limited at
the present time. Only three cases have stated that the correlative rights
rule would apply to pollution situations.s7 But the two cases which found
pollution and granted or denied relief did not apply that rule. Instead, they
treated negligence as an exception to the general rule rather than as one of
the balancing factors.38
While courts have overwhelmingly preferred nuisance law to diversion
allocation rules in percolating groundwater pollution cases, the preference
for nuisance law over negligence law is slight 39 Furthermore, there is little
correlation between the courts which apply nuisance law to surface water-
course pollution and those which apply it to percolating groundwater
pollution. Only eight states strongly prefer the use of private nuisance law
in both surface watercourse and percolating groundwater pollution situa-
tions. 40 Indeed two states strongly prefer nuisance law for surface water-
course pollution, while rejecting it in favor of negligence law in percolating
groundwater pollution situations.4 ' Many courts are ambivalent about the
choice between nuisance law and negligence law in groundwater pollution
cases.42 One explanation for a nuisance preference in groundwater cases
might be that this approach allows for liability without any finding of
culpability. This last requirement is not too onerous in surface water cases
where the polluter can reasonably assess the consequences of his acts. How-
ever it creates problems in subsurface cases because he often cannot predict
the results of his polluting activity. Use of negligence law permits the
courts to take into account the ability of each particular polluter to predict
85. North-East Coal Co. v. Hayes, 244 Ky. 689, 643-44, 51 S.W.2d 960,
962 (1932); P. Ballantine & Sons v. Public Serv. Corp., 86 N.J.L. 331, 333-34,
91 A. 95, 96 (1914); Panther Coal Co. v. Looney, 185 Va. 758, 765-68, 40
S.E.2d 298, 302-03 (1946).
See also Davis, Wells and Streams 203-04; MALONEY, PLACER & BALDwIN,
supra note 17, at 157-58; Maloney & Plager, supra note 17, at 770-71; Thomas,
supra note 17, at 360. Hanks & Hanks, supra note 17, at 643-44, incorrectly state
the view that Arkansas, Delaware, Minnesota, and Tennessee have adopted the
western correlative rights rule, which is a prorationing concept to be employed
during shortages. See Davis, Wells and Streams 203.
86. The seven states are listed in note 137 infra.
87. See cases cited in note 35 supra.
38. See the North-East Coal (deny relief) and the Ballantine (grant relief)
cases note 35 supra.
39. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
40. Arkansas, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Minnesota, Nebraska, and
Wisconsin. See Table I in Appendix C infra.
41. Missouri and Oklahoma. Id.
42. Id.
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the consequences of his activity.
Because most courts have refused to apply the diversion allocation
rules to pollution of percolating groundwater, the real choices have been
negligence law, nuisance law, their derivative the Restatement rule, and
strict liability for escape of abnormally dangerous substances.
IL DISTINCTION BErWE-N NEGLIGENCE AND NUISANCE LAw
The courts have utilized negligence law and nuisance law about equally
in percolating groundwater pollution situations. There are 74 negligence law
cases, 3 public nuisance, 83 private nuisance cases and 4 Restatement rule
cases reported in the United States, England and Canada.43 Of the 41
jurisdictions which have consistently followed one of these bodies of law,
only 5 have clearly preferred negligence law,44 while 10 have preferred
nuisance law,4 5 and 2 have adopted the Restatement rule.48 The remaining
24 jurisdictions are ambivalent about the choice of law.47 This section will
discuss the various legal grounds for choosing one body of law or the other.
It will also analyze the various types of fact situations where the courts
have used one or the other, to determine if there are any clear legal or
factual guideposts for making the choice.
A. Negligence
The use of negligence law in deciding percolating groundwater pollu-
tion cases probably arises from the general proposition that the percolating
groundwater diversion allocation rules should be followed when an injury
to a neighboring landowner's water supply occurs under circumstances in
which the injury is not to be expected, is not known, or would not have
become known in the exercise of reasonable foresight. According to negli-
gence theory, a groundwater user will be liable for his pollution if he knew
or should have known that his activity would be likely to cause the injury
which occurred.48 The focus for determining liability under negligence
theory is not directed at the care with which the groundwater user has
conducted his business, but is instead directed at the predictability of
injurious consequences arising from his activity, however carefully con-
43. See cases cited in Appendix B infra. This contrasts with 2 diversion
allocation rule cases, 20 strict liability cases and 15 cases which do not specify
which theory is being utilized. Id.
44. Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, and Rhode Island. See
Table 1 in Appendix C infra.
45. Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska,
Washington, Wisconsin and England. Id. Although Illinois apparently prefers
nuisance law to negligence law, it has utilized the strict liability rule as often as
nuisance law. Hence, its real preference is unclear. Id.
46. Montana and Pennsylvania. Id.
47. Id.
48. Phillips v. Sun Oil Co., 807 N.Y. 328, 331, 121 N.E.2d 249, 251 (1954);
Collins v. Chartiers Valley Gas Co., 131 Pa. 143, 159, 18 A. 1012, 1013 (1890).
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ducted.4 9 This concept of negligence explains those cases which hold that
negligence law, rather than nuisance law, should be utilized where perco-
lating groundwater pollution is caused by an occurrence or activity involving,
neither unavoidable consequences nor consequences naturally anticipated.50
In other words, if, in the normal conduct of an activity, groundwater pollu-
tion will not occur, the court will follow negligence law when it does occur.
B. Private Nuisance
Nuisance, by contrast, does not look at either the comparative reason-
ableness of a person's conduct or activity or at the predictability of the
injurious consequences arising from it. Instead it addresses itself to the
nature of those injurious consequences and the reasonableness of their impact
on the injured landowner. Hence, a nuisance can be created both by
negligent activities and non-negligent activities, as some percolating ground-
water pollution cases have recognized.51 A private nuisance is an interference
with private property interests; Prosser defines it as:
[A] n unreasonable interference with the interest in the use and
enjoyment of land... It is distinguished from trespass in that the
interference is with use or enjoyment, rather than with the interest
in exclusive possession. 52
One case, dealing with pollution of a surface watercourse, comprehensively
defined a private nuisance as one involving:
[SI uch impurities as substantially impair [the water's] value for the
ordinary purposes of life, and render it measurably unfit for domes-
tic purposes, or such as causes unwholesome or offensive vapors or
odors to arise from the water, and thus impairs the comfortable or
beneficial enjoyment of property in its vicinity .... 53
Typical examples of nuisances created by water pollution are pollution of
domestic, livestock, and public water supplies and creation of odors inter-
49. Swift & Co. v. Peoples Coal & Oil Co., 121 Conn. 579, 588, 186 A. 629,
638 (1986).
50. Long v. Louisville & N.R.R., 128 Ky. 26, 31-34, 107 S.W. 203, 205-06
(1908); Collins v. Chartiers Valley Gas Co., 131 Pa. 143, 159-60, 18 A. 1012,
1013-14 (1890); McNary v. Southwest Pa. Pipe Lines, 34 Pa. County Ct. 441,
44,-45, 17 Pa. Dist. 847, 849-50 (C.P. 1908); Ressler v. Gerlach, 189 Pa. Super.
192, 195, 149 A.2d 158, 160 (1959); Rose v. Socony-Vacuum Corp., 54 R.I. 411,
420, 173 A. 627, 629 (1934). See also Trillingham v. Alaska Housing Authority,
109 F. Supp. 924, 924 (D. Alas. 1953); Bollinger v. Mungle, 175 S.W.2d 912,
915 (St. L. Mo. App. 1943).
51. Swift & Co. v. Peoples Coal & Oil Co., 121 Conn. 579, 588, 186 A. 629,
633 (1936); McNary v. Southwest Pa. Pipe Lines, 34 Pa. County Ct. 441, 445,
17 Pa. Dist. 847, 849 (C.P. 1908); Rose v. Standard Oil Co., 56 R.I. 272, 278,
185 A. 251, 254-55 (1936).
52. W. PnossE , ToRTs 405 (2d ed. 1955). See also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
or TonTs § 821D (Tent. Draft No. 16, 1970).
53. Trevett v. Prison Assn, 98 Va. 332, 336, 36 S.E. 373, 374 (1900),
uoting 1 H. WOOD, NuIsANCEs § 427 (3d ed. 1893). For a fuller discussion of the
efinition of private nuisance as it applies to water pollution, see Davis, Water
Pollution Litigation 740-41, 749-50.
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feting with places of habitation or employment.5 4 Percolating groundwater
cases expressly acknowledge that a nuisance is created when underground
water is so contaminated that it cannot be used for a domestic or livestock
water supply.
5
Activities which are closely related to the user's land, or productive
use of his particular land, are said not to constitute nuisances.56 They do
not fall within the general nuisance classification even though such activities
may involve unavoidable or forseeable interference with another's land.5r
Hence, pollution caused by mine drainage or oil well salt water would not
constitute a nuisance and would be governed by negligence law, since those
are uses specifically tied to particular locations. By contrast, pollution caused
by gas manufacturing residues or oil refinery leaks would constitute a
nuisance; they are not required to be located in a particular place, and such
pollution is a probable consequence of the activity.
Many courts have stated that continuing a polluting activity once the
pollution situation comes to the attention of the polluter also constitutes a
nuisance. 58 This is true whether negligence or nuisance law would be applied
to injuries occurring prior to the polluter becoming aware of it.
C. Statistical Analysis of the Cases
It is interesting to test the aforementioned theoretical definitions of
negligence and private nuisance against the results which the courts have
reached in actual cases. In this regard, the following questions are partic-
ularly important:
(1) Do the courts follow nuisance law when the pollution is an
unavoidable consequence of the activity, or at least a consequence naturally
to be anticipated as they say they do? Stated conversely, do the courts follow
negligence law when the actor could anticipate the pollution and when he
knew that the pollution would occur?
54. Davis, Water Pollution Litigation 750.
55. See, e.g., Swift & Co. v. Peoples Coal & Oil Co., 121 Conn. 579, 590-
92, 186 A. 629, 634 (1936); Kinnaird v. Standard Oil Co., 89 Ky. 468, 474,
12 S.W. 937, 938 (1890); Ballard v. Tomlinson, 29 Ch. D. 115, 126 (C.A. 1885)
(per Lindley, L.J.).
56. Bayer v. Nello L. Teer Co., 256 N.C. 509, 517-18, 124 S.E.2d 552, 558(1962); Hauck v. Tide Water Pipe-Line Co., 153 Pa. 366, 375-77, 26 A. 645,
645-46 (1893); Schroll v. George Brown's Sons, Inc., 41 Lane. Law Rev. 297,
298-300 (Pa. C.P. 1928); Rarick v. Smith, 17 Pa. County Ct. 627, 631-32, 5 Pa.
Dist. 530, (C.P. 1896). See also Burr v. Adam Eidemiller, Inc. 386 Pa. 416,
421-22, 126 A.2d 403, 408 "(1956).
57. Collins v. Chartiers Valley Gas Co., 131 Pa. 143, 159-60, 18 A. 1012,
1013-14 (1890); McNary v. Southwest Pa. Pipe Lines, 34 Pa. County Ct. 441,
445, 17 Pa. Dist. 847, 849 (C.P. 1908).
58. Long v. Louisville & N.R.R., 128 Ky. 26, 34, 107 S.W. 203, 206 (1908);
Ball v. Nye, 99 Mass. 582, 584 (1868); Tolatti v. Enama, 26 Luz. L. Reg. Rep.
344, 346 (Pa. C.P. 1931) (by implication); Gagnon v. Landry, 103 R.I. 45, 51,
234 A.2d 674, 677 (1967). See also Burr v. Adam Eidemiller, Inc., 386 Pa. 416,
422-24, 126 A.2d 403, 407 (1956).
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(2) Do the courts apply the above nuisance rule to all situations or
only when the activity does not have a necessary relationship to the partic-
ular land where the activity is conducted as they indicate they wil?
(3) Does continuation of the polluting activity without a good faith
effort to abate after the polluter becomes aware of the injurious conse-
quences of his activity cause the courts to shift the case from negligence law
to private nuisance law as they indicate it will?
The answers can be ascertained by analyzing the factual and decisional
theory relationships in the percolating groundwater pollution cases.
In referring to the first question above concerning predictability, these
types of uses can be subdivided into two groups: those having a propensity
for causing pollution, such as oil refineries, gas manufacturing plants, fac-
tories and cemeteries (at least before burial in vaults became mandatory),
and those having little likelihood of causing pollution with normal operations,
such as pipelines and service stations. Nuisance law, it is asserted, applies in
the first subdivided group of situations, and negligence law applies in the
second group. Theoretically negligence law also applies in situations where
the activity has a necessary relationship to the land; certain uses of land
must be conducted in particular places. These include uses such as mining
and the recovery of oil and gas.
The cases seem to bear out the accuracy of such a classification of fact
situations. The following table shows the law applied to the above described
groups of cases.n9
59. See Table 2 in Appendix C infra and cases coded by the respective letters
in Appendix B infra.
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TABLE I
Code Law Applied
Case Group Letter Private
(See "Codings" Negligence Nuisance
in Appendices) (no. of cases) (no. of cases)
1. Polluting activity does
not have necessary rela-
tion to tract of land
a. Pollution probable
(nuisance law predicted)
- oil refinery or
distributor H 4 4
- gas plant K 6 9
factory or other
commercial activity L 1 9
- cemetery Q 1 24
Total 12 46
b. Pollution unlikely(negligence law
predicted)
- pipeline I 9 2
- service station J 9 5
Total 18 7
2. Polluting activity has
necessary relation to
tract of land (negligence
law predicted)
- mining E 3 0
- oil well G 26 3
Total 29 3
This table shows that the courts tend to utilize nuisance and negligence law
in the manner called for by the rules concerning the activity's relationship
to the land and its propensity to cause pollution.60
The courts tend to regard human and animal waste products as being
potentially polluting and, therefore, governed by nuisance law. The follow-
ing table shows the law applied to human and animal waste situations.6
TABLE II
Code Law Applied
Case Group Letter Private
(See "Codings" Negligence Nuisance
in Appendices) (no. of cases) (no. of cases)
Human or animal waste
- domestic sewage A 3 11
- city sewer B 0 1
- city treatment plant C 1 1
- collective source D 3 5
- farm wastes M 3 5
Total 10 23
The tendency toward nuisance law in these cases, while not as pronounced
as in the groups of cases in Table I, is significant. It can be regarded as
60. Because the great majority of these cases involved pollution of domestic
and livestock water supplies, the nature of the consequences of the pollution did
not influence the choice of theory, and therefore, the results reflect the source of
the pollution.
61. See Table 2 in Appendix C infra and cases coded by the respective letters
in Appendix B infra.
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another illustration of the rule that activities having no necessary relation
to particular tracts of land and being probable sources of pollution are
governed by nuisance law.
The third question focuses on the effect which abatement, or on the
other hand, failure to abate, will have on the choice of theory. It is said
that nuisance law will be applied if a polluter fails to abate after being
requested to do so by the injured landowner, whereas negligence law will
be applied if a good faith effort is made to abate.6 2 The following table
classifies cases on the basis of abatement after notice. In all of them the
causal connection between the activity and the pollution was established.
TABLE III
(See Codings in Appendices for
Meaning of letters and symbols in parentheses)
Rule Followed No. of Coases Footnote No.
Defendant abates or attempts to
abate-negligence law applied
Plaintiff wins (a-b,*)
Defendant wins on basis of
rule (d)




Defendant fails to abate
-nuisance law applied
Plaintiff wins (a-b, 0 )
Total
Rule Not Followed
Defendant abates or attempts to
abate-nuisance law applied
Plaintiff wins (a-b,0 )
Defendant win on basis of
rule (d)









This table indicates that
of the cases. Because attem
16 69
9 70
the asserted rule was followed in 58 percent
pt, refusal, or failure to abate a polluting
62. See cases cited note 56 supra stating such a rule.
63. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Bennett, 123 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1941-Tenn.) (Jla);
Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Keister, 64 F.2d 537 (6th Cir. 1933-Ohio) (Jla); Monroe
"66" Oil Co. v. Hightower, 180 So. 2d 8 (La. App. 1965) (J5a); P. Ballantine &
Sons. v. Public Serv. Corp., 76 N.J.L. 358, 70 A. 167 (1908) (K5a); Sheridan
Oil Co. v. Wall, 187 Okla. 398, 103 P.2d 507 (1940) (Gl,3a); Meddock v.
National Transit Co., 105 Pa. Super. 553, 161 A. 628 (1932) (Ila); Brown v.
Lundell, 162 Tex. 84, 344 S.W.2d 863 (1961), aff'g 334 S.W.2d 616 (Civ. App.
1960) (G4a); Geochemical Surveys v. Dietz, 340 S.W.2d 114 (Tex. Civ. App.
1960) (Gla); Texas Co. v. Giddings, 148 S.W. 1142 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912)
(11,Sa); Bennett v. Imperial Oil Ltd., 46 Mar. Prov. 50, 28 D.L.R.2d 55 (Newf.
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1961) (Jla). Consult the Appendices for the case codings.
64. Gauvreau v. Gulf Ref. Co., 288 Mass. 54, 192 N.E. 200 (1934) (Jld);
Bollinger v. Mungle, 175 S.W.2d 912 (St. L. Mo. App. 1943) (Jlid); Phillips v.
Sun Oil Co., 307 N.Y. 328, 121 N.E.2d 249 (1954) (JId); Thompson v. Board
of Educ., 124 Misc. 840, 209 N.Y.S. 362 (Sup. Ct. 1925) (D3d); Ressler v.
Gerlach, 189 Pa. Super. 192, 149 A.2d 158 (1959) (Dld); Humble Pipe Line
Co. v. Anderson, 339 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960) (Ild).
65. Brown v. Illius, 25 Conn. 583 (1857) (KSa); Atkinson v. Herington
Cattle Co., 200 Kan. 298, 436 P.2d 816 (1968) (M3a); Klassen v. Central Kan.
Coop. Creamery Assn, 160 Kan. 697, 165 P.2d 601 (1946) (L~a); Czipott v.
Fleigh, 87 Nev. 496, 489 P.2d 681 (1971) (Mlb); Bassett v. Osborn, 23 Ohio
C.C.R.(n.s.) 342, 34 Ohio C.C. Dec. 284 (1912) (Alb); Ulmen v. Mt. Angel,
57 Ore. 547, 112 P. 529 (1911) (BPlb); Hawk v. Davis, 76 Pa. Super. 565(1921) (Alb); Paine & Co., Ltd. v. St. Neots Gas & Coke Co. [1939] 3 All E.R.
812 (C.A.), aff'g [1938] 4 All E.R. 592 (K.B.) (K5a).
66. Hall v. Galey, 126 Kan. 699, 271 P. 319 (1928) (G1,3,4a); Berry v.
Shell Petroleum Co., 140 Kan. 94, 33 P.2d 953 (1934), rehearing denied, 141
Kan. 6, 40 P.2d 359 (1935) (Cla); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Simpson, 17 Ky. L.R.
989, 33 S.W. 395 (1895) (Rla); Kinnaird v. Standard Oil Co., 89 Ky. 468,
12 S.W. 937 (1890) (H1,3a); Mears v. Dole, 135 Mass. 508 (1883) (Rlab);
Ball v. Nye, 99 Mass. 582 (1868) (M1,6a); Sherman v. Fall River Iron Works,
87 Mass. (5 Allen) 213 (1862) (L3j*); Beatrice Gas Co. v. Thomas, 41 Neb.
662, 59 N.W. 925 (1894) (K1,3i*); Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Merritt, 332 P.2d
677 (Okla. 1958) (Gla); Danciger Oil & Ref. Co. v. Donahey, 208 Okla. 390,
238 P.2d 308 (1951) (Gl,3a); Vandivort v. Hunter, 265 Pa. 585, 109 A. 479
(1920) (Ali*); Haugh's Appeal, 102 Pa. 42, 2 Walk. 376 (1882) (Alb); Potts-
town Gas Co. v. Murphy, 39 Pa. 257 (1861) (Kla); Shuter v. The City, 3 Phila.
Pa. 228 (Dist. Ct. 1858) (Kla); Haveman v. Beulow, 36 Wash. 2d 185, 217
P.2d 313 (1950) (LIab); Millington v. Griffiths, 30 L.T.R.(n.s.) 65 (C.P. 1874)
(Kla); Turner v. Mirfield, 34 Beav. 390, 55 Eng. Rep. 685 (Rolls 1865) (L7b);
Ballard v. Tomlinson, 29 Ch. D. 115 (C.A. 1885), rev'g 26 Ch. D. 194 (1884)
(D5ab); Hubbs v. Prince Edward County, 8 D.L.R.2d 394 (Ont. 1957) (R1,5ab).
67. Shelley v. Ozark Pipe Line Corp., 327 Mo. 238, 37 S.W.2d 518 (1931)
(Ila); Continental Oil Co. v. Berry, 52 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932)
(Jli*); Anstee v. Monroe Light & Fuel Co., 171 Wis. 291, 177 N.W. 26 (1920)
(Kla); British Am. Oil Co. Ltd. v. Burrill, [1942] Que. K.B. 218 (C.A.) (J1,6a).
68. Brown v. Illius, 25 Conn. 583 (1857) (KSa); Woodward v. Aborn, 35
Me. 271 (1853) (Mla).
69. O'Brien v. Primm, 243 Ark. 186, 419 S.W.2d 323 (1967) (Gla); Pensa-
cola Gas Co. v. Pebley, 25 Fla. 381, 5 So. 593 (1889) (Kla); North Ga. Petroleum
Co. v. Lewis, 128 Ga. App. 653, 197 S.E.2d 437 (1973) (J1,3a); Van Brocklin
v. Gudema, 50 Ill. App. 2d 20, 199 N.E.2d 457 (1964) (Mla); Phoenix v.
Graham, 349 Ill. App. 826, 110 N.E.2d 669 (1953) (Cli*); Shelley v. Ozark
Pipe Line Corp., 247 S.W. 472 (Spr. Mo. App. 1923); P. Ballantine & Sons v.
Public Serv. Corp., 86 N.J.L. 331, 91 A. 95 (1914) (Ka); De Feo v. People's
Gas Co., 6 N.J. Misc. 790, 142 A. 756 (Sup. Ct. 1928) (Ila); Elsey v. Adirondack
& St. L.R.R., 97 Misc. 273, 161 N.Y.S. 391 (Sup. Ct. 1916) (N1,3b); Harper-
Turner Oil Co. v. Bridge, 311 P.2d 947 (Okla. 1957) (Gla); Schlichtkrull v.
Mellon-Pollock Oil Co. (No. 1), 301 Pa. 553, 152 A. 829 (1930) (Gla); Collins
v. Chartiers Valley Gas Co., 139 Pa. 111, 21 A. 147 (1891) (Cla); General
Crude Oil Co. v. Aiken, 162 Tex. 104, 344 S.W.2d 668 (1961), rev'g 335 S.W.2d
229 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960) (C1,3a); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Alexander, 156 Tex. 455,
295 S.W.2d 901 (1956), aff'g per curiam, 291 S.W.2d 792 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956)
(G4a); Pickens v. Harrison, 151 Tex. 562, 252 S.W.2d 575 (1952), modiftying
246 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) (G4a); Crawford v. Yeatts, 395 S.W.2d
413 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) (Cla).
70. North-East Coal Co. v. Hayes, 244 Ky. 639, 51 S.W.2d 960 (1932)
(E1,3d); United Fuel Gas Co. v. Sawyers, 259 S.W.2d 466 (Ky. 1953) (CId);
Dillon v. Acme Oil Co., 49 Hun 565, 2 N.Y.S. 289 (Sup. Ct. 1888) (Hid); Easton
v. State, 153 Misc. 395, 275 N.Y.S. 119 (Ct. Cl. 1934), modified, 245 App. Div.
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activity may influence the theory applied, those case totals may not repre-
sent any clear trend favoring the asserted rule. At best they only suggest
that such a rule may exist.
D. Other Suggested Rules for Choosing Between Negligence and Nuisance
Two courts have suggested that, in mining and oil and gas well situa-
tions, the rule applying negligence law to pollution caused by activities
having a necessary relation to the tract of land is applicable only as between
the holder of the surface interest and the holder of the mineral interest in
the same tract of land. As between the holder of the mineral interest and
unrelated adjoining landowners the law of nuisance is said to apply.7 '
This rule is not supported by other cases. All 10 cases involving pollution
of a surface owner's well by the activities of the underlying mineral owner
utilized negligence law.7 2 However, contrary to the suggested rule, 15 cases
involving pollution of percolating groundwater which was caused by the
activities of unrelated mineral owners on neighboring lands, have been
decided on the basis of negligence law.73 Only three cases were decided on
the basis of nuisance law in conformance with the suggested rule.74 Courts
489, 283 N.Y.S. 809, affd mere. 271 N.Y. 507, 2 N.E.2d 669 (1936) (Pld);Bayer v. Nello L. Teer Co., 256 N.C. 509, 124 S.E.2d 552 (1962) (Eld); Wheeler
v. Fisher Oil Co., 6 Ohio N.P. 309, 9 Ohio Dec. 294 (1899) (Old); Eidemiller v.Keystone Coal & Coke Co., 15 Pa. D. & C. 759, 17 West. 157 (C.P. 1930) (Eld);Rose v. Socony-Vacuum Corp., 54 R.I. 411, 173 A. 627 (1934) (H1,3d); Petersen
v. Cache County Drainage Dist. No. 5, 77 Utah 256, 294 P. 289 (1930).
71. Phoenix v. Graham, 349 IM. App. 326, 110 N.E.2d 669 (1958); CitiesServ. Oil Co. v. Merritt, 332 P.2d 677, 684 (Okla. 1958). '72. H.W. Peerson Drilling Co. v. Scoggins, 216 Ala. 284, 74 So. 2d 450(1954); Phoenix v. Graham, 349 III. App. 826, 110 N.E.2d 669 (1953); Wynn v.Wilson, 252 Ky. 352, 67 S.W.2d 483 (1984); North-East Coal Co. v. Hayes,244 Ky. 639, 51 S.W.2d 960 (1982); Sheridan Oil Co. v. Wall, 187 Okla. 398,103 P.2d 507 (1940); Geochemical Surveys v. Dietz, 340 S.W.2d 114 (Tex. Civ.App. 1960); General Crude Oil Co. v. Aiken, 162 Tex. 104, 344 S.W.2d 668(1961), rev'g 885 S.W.,d 229 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960); Brown v. Lundell, 162Tex. 84, 844 S.W.2d 863 (1961), affg 334 S.W.2d 616 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960);Crawford v. Yeatts, 395 S.W.2d 413 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965); McCoy v. Cohen,
149 W.Va. 197, 140 S.E.2d 427 (1965).
73. Polzin v. National Co-op. Refinery Ass'n, 175 Kan. 531, 266 P.2d 293(1954); United Fuel Gas Co. v. Sawyers, 259 S.W.2d 466 (Ky. 1953); Joldersma
v. Muskegon Dev. Co., 286 Mich. 520, 282 N.W. 229 (1938); Magnolia PetroleumCo. v. Williams, 222 Miss. 538, 76 So. 2d 865 (1954); Bayer v. Nello L. Teer Co.,256 N.C. 509, 124 S.E.2d 552 (1962); Wheeler v. Fisher Oil Co., 6 Ohio N.P.309, 9 Ohio Dec. 294 (1899); Norman v. Greenland Drilling Co., 403 P.2d 507(Okla. 1965); Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. Tisdale, 866 P.2d 614 (Okla.1961); Harper-Turner Oil Co. v. Bridge, 811 P.2d 947 (Okla. 1957); ShellPetroleum Corp. v. Blubaugh, 187 Okla. 198, 102 P.2d 163 (1940); Cities Serv.Gas Co. v. Eggers, 186 Okla. 466, 98 P.2d 1114 (1940); Schlichtkrull v. Mellon-Pollock Oil Co. (No. 1), 801 Pa. 553, 152 A. 829 (1980); Collins v. ChartiersValley Gas Co., 139 Pa. 111, 21 A. 147 (1891); Collins v. Chartiers Valley GasCo., 131 Pa. 143, 18 A. 1012 (1890); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Alexander, 291 S.W.2d792 (Tex. Civ. App.), affd per curiam, 156 Tex. 455, 295 S.W.2d 901 (1956).
74. Hall v. Galey, 126 Kan. 699, 271 P. 319 (1928); Cities Serv. Oil Co.
v. Merritt, 332 P.2d 677 (Okla. 1958); Danciger Oil & Ref. Co. v. Donahey, 205Okla. 890, 238 P.2d 808 (1951).
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decide the vast majority of all mining and oil and gas well cases under
negligence law regardless of the relationship between the polluter and the
injured surface owner.75 Therefore, it would appear the relationship between
the two is irrelevant in the determination whether to utilize negligence or
nuisance law.
Two courts have suggested that industrial states tend to utilize negli-
gence law in percolating groundwater pollution situations, while agricultural
states tend to utilize nuisance law or strict liability rules.76 The cases do
not substantiate that assertion. As noted before, most states are ambivalent
about the choice between negligence and nuisance law. Both industrial and
agricultural states are included in this group.77 There are some states which
seem to confirm the assertion; three industrial states follow negligence law7"
and seven agricultural states follow nuisance law.79 But the assertion cannot
be said to constitute a rule when industrial and mining jurisdictions such
as Kentucky, Massachusetts and England utilize nuisance law, agricultural
states such as Missouri and Oklahoma utilize negligence law, 0 and a large
group of states utilize both in roughly equal amounts."' No state preferred
strict liability rules.
I concluded in a previous article82 that in surface watercourse pollution
cases the courts will follow private nuisance law when traditional nuisance 3
types of pollution are treated and riparian rights law will be applied when
non-nuisance types of pollution are created.84 One might expect a similar
pattern in percolating groundwater pollution cases; if traditional nuisances
were involved, decisions would be based on private nuisance law, while
non-nuisance types of pollution would be decided under negligence law.
Such a pattern does not exist. Nearly all of the 180 cases involved tradi-
tional nuisance types of pollution (166 cases), and they are about evenly
split on decisional theory between private nuisance law (97 cases) and
75. See discussion and table accompanying note 59 supra.
76. Trillingham v. Alaska Housing Authority, 109 F. Supp. 924, 924 (D.
Alas. 1953); Rose v. Socony-Vacuum Corp., 54 R.I. 411, 421, 173 A. 627, 631(1934).
77. Ambivalent industrial states include Connecticut, Illinois, Ohio and
Pennsylvania. Ambivalent agricultural states include Alabama and Maine. See
Table 1 in Appendix C infra.
78. New Jersey, New York and Rhode Island. Id.




82. Davis, Water Pollution Litigation 738.
83. Traditional nuisances include such injuries as poisoning of a domestic
or livestock water supply, degradation of soil fertility, and odors interfering with
habitation and places of work.
84. Where traditional nuisances were created, 199 surface watercourse pollu-
tion cases applied private nuisance law while only 66 applied riparian rights law.
Where non-nuisance types of pollution were created, only 34 applied private
nuisance law while 70 applied riparian rights law. Davis, Water Pollution Litiga-
tion App. D, at 805-06.
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negligence law (83 cases). There are only a few cases (14) involving non-
nuisance types of pollution, They are also almost evenly split between private
nuisance law (6 cases) and negligence law (8 cases), s- The only conclusion
is that the type of pollution injury suffered has no bearing on the choice
between private nuisance law and negligence law as the basis for deciding
the case.
III. REsTATEmNT RULE
Two states have broken away from the common law rules of negligence
and nuisance in percolating groundwater cases and have adopted the
Restatement rule concerning interferences with the use of land. 6 Section
822 of the Restatement of Torts provides:
The actor is liable in an action for damages for a non-tres-
passory invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoy-
ment of land if,
(a) the other has property rights and privileges in respect to
the use or enjoyment interfered with; and
(b) the invasion is substantial; and
(c) the actor's conduct is a legal cause of the invasion; and
(d) the invasion is either
(i) intentional and unreasonable; or
(ii) unintentional and otherwise actionable under the
rules governing liability for negligent, reckless or
ultrahazardous conduct.87
Whether this rule makes any basic changes in the law of nuisance
depends on the Restatements definition of "intentional" and "unreasonable".
Under the Restatement an actor commits an intentional invasion when he
does either of the following:
(a) acts for the purpose of causing it; or
(b) knows that it is resulting or is substantially certain to result
from his conduct.88
This language makes common law nuisances unactionable when they
are created by non-negligent activity where the actor either took every pre-
caution to avoid the invasion or did not expect the particular invasion which
occurred. An illustration in the Restatement makes this clear.
[A owns a parcel of land on which he erects and starts to
operate a factory. B owns land 200 yards from A's factory on which
he operates a poultry farm.] B gets water for his poultry business
from a well on his land, and A dumps the waste matter in a depres-
sion on his land from which it seeps into the ground and is carried
300 yards underground to B's -well by an unknown flow of perco-
lating water. The water in B's well is contaminated so that it can-
85. See Table 3, in Appendix C infra.
86. Montana and Pennsylvania. See cases listed in App. B, Pt. D infra.
87. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 822 (1939).
88. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 825 (1939).
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not be used in his poultry business for some time. The invasion of
B's interest in the use and enjoyment of his land is not intentional.8 9
Professor Fleming James objected to Section 822's language because
it improperly reflects the case law: there are many nuisance cases imposing
liability where the actor intentionally conducted an activity which caused
an unintended injury even though he was not negligent, reckless or
conducting an ultrahazardous or abnormally dangerous activity. They
impose liability because the injury suffered is too great to be borne with-
out compensation. 0
The percolating groundwater pollution cases support Professor James'
objection. Eleven utilize nuisance law and impose liability where the
Restatement rule would have made the invasion unactionable. These cases
involved oil distributor storage leaks, 91 pipeline leaks, 92 service station gaso-
line leaks,93 furnace oil tank leaks,94 gas manufacturing residues,9 5 gas main
leaks, 96 manure pile drainage,97 and buried animals.98 In each, the lawsuit
was brought relatively soon after the pollution was discovered, and the
polluter did not refuse to abate the pollution: in most, abatement was
effected. 99 However, there are eight cases, involving disposal of human
wastes, 100 pipeline leaks. 1 and service station gasoline leaks,'10 2 which re-
fused to impose liability under those circumstances. They invoked negli-
gence law. The Restatement would find no liability in all these 19 fact
situations, although the courts imposed liability in a majority of them under
89. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 825, illustration No. 3 (1939). Illustration 3
to RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 832 (1939) also supports this view. The bracketed
language is from illustration 2 in § 825.
90. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS, App. A at 132-41 (Tent. Draft
No. 16, 1970).
91. Kinnaird v. Standard Oil Co., 89 Ky. 468, 12 S.W. 937 (1890).
92. Shelley v. Ozark Pipe Line Corp., 327 Mo. 238, 37 S.W.2d 518 (1931);
Hauck v. Tide Water Pipe-Line Co., 153 Pa. 366, 26 A. 644 (1893).
93. Continental Oil Co. v. Berry, 52 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932);
British Am. Oil Co. Ltd. v. Burrill, [1942] Que. K.B. 218 (C.A.).
94. Kostyal v. Cass, 163 Conn. 92, 302 A.2d 121 (1972).
95. Berger v. Minneapolis Gaslight Co., 60 Minn. 296, 62 N.W. 336 (1895);
Anstee v. Monroe Light & Fuel Co., 171 Wis. 291, 177 N.W. 26 (1920).
96. Sherman v. Fall River Iron Works, 87 Mass. (5 Allen) 213 (1862).
97. Ball v. Nye, 99 Mass. 582 (1868).
98. Louisville & N.R.R. v. Simpson, 17 Ky.L.R. 989, 33 S.W. 395 (1895).
99. The Restatement makes actionable pollution occurring after the polluter
"knows" it is resulting. See text accompanying note 88 &upra. The cases selected
do not fall within that actionable category.
100. Thompson v. Board of Educ., 124 Misc. 840, 209 N.Y.S. 362 (Sup. Ct.
1925); Ressler v. Gerlach, 189 Pa. Super. 192, 149 A.2d 158 (1959); Tolatti v.
Enama, 26 Luz. L. Reg. Rep. 344 (Pa. C.P. 1931); Gagnon v. Landry, 103 R.I.
45, 234 A.2d 674 (1967).
101. Humble Pipe Line Co. v. Anderson, 339 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. Civ. App.
1960).
102. Gauvreau v. Gulf Ref. Co., 288 Mass. 54, 192 N.E. 220 (1934);
Bollinger v. Mungle, 175 S.W.2d 912 (St. L. Mo. App. 1943); Phillips v. Sun
Oil Co., 807 N.Y. 328, 121 N.E.2d 249 (1954).
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nuisance law. 103 This is strpng evidence that the Restatement rule runs
counter to the predominant precedent. The tentative revisions of the
Restatement have not altered this approach to private nuisance. 104 I agree
with Professor James that the Restatement neither represents the existing
law, at least with respect to percolating groundwater pollution, nor does it
represent a desirable rule for the future.
IV. STmcr Li_ mrrry
Eleven jurisdictions have imposed strict liability for certain types of
percolating groundwater pollution.105 In several of these jurisdictions it
was imposed by statute.100 Two followed the abnormally dangerous con-
duct rule which is defined by a tentative revision of the Restatement of
Torts.07 It is significant that the courts have imposed strict liability only
where activities of the oil and gas industry, mining industry and manu-
factured gas industry have caused the pollution. 08 Thus the courts have
found pollution caused by salt water from oil and gas wells, acid mine
wastes, oil pipeline leaks, and residues from gas manufacturing plants partic-
ularly obnoxious and subject to strict liability. 0 9 This is true in spite of the
fact that the majority of other states have preferred negligence law to
nuisance law for controlling the polluting activities of the mining and oil
and gas industries, 110 and nuisance law is only preferred in cases dealing
with pollution caused by the manufacture of gas."'- These 11 jurisdictions
apparently follow the abnormally dangerous conduct rule in the above
103. While many of the cases in the two groups are not distinguishable on
the facts, eleven of the fifteen cases not involving disposal of human wastes
imposed liability under nuisance law.
104. RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs §822 (Tent. Draft No. 16, 1970),provides: One is subject to liability for a private nuisance if, but only if, his
conduct is a legal cause of the invasion of the interest in the private use
and enjoyment of land, and such invasion is
(a) intentional and unreasonable,
(b) negligent or reckless, or
(c) actionable under the rules governing liability for abnormally
dangerous conditions or activities.
105. Alabama, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Okla-
homa, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas and England. See cases listed in App.
B, Pt. E infra.
106. Kansas, Pennsylvania and England. Id.
107. &EsTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs §§ 519-20 (Tent. Draft No. 10,
1964). Maryland and South Dakota follow this section which substitutes an
"abnormally dangerous activity" test for the "ultrahazardous activity" of the
original REsTATEm:ENT OF TonTs. Yommer v. McKenzie, 255 Md. 220, 223-26,
257 A.2d 138, 189-41 (1969); Watson v. Great Lakes Pipeline Co., 85 S.D.
310, 319-20, 182 N.W.2d 314, 319 (1970).
108. See Table 2, in Appendix C infra.
109. See cases coded E, C, I, and K respectively in App. B, Pt. E infra.
110. See Table 2, in Appendix C infra and text accompanying note 75 supra.
See also Pt. II, §A and B of this article.
111. See Table 2, in Appendix C infra and discussion at Pt. II, §§ A and B of
this article.
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situations because those activities are not entered into by the great mass of
mankind, and they do result in extensive injury to percolating groundwater
supplies if their waste products are uncontrolled. 1 2
V. PuBL c NUSANCE
The concept of public nuisance comprehends threats to the public
health, safety, and welfare. Only three percolating groundwater cases have
involved an application of public nuisance law. Two involved pollution of
individual domestic wells. They were brought by private parties claiming
a special damage different in kind and degree from that suffered by the
public at large." 3 The third involved pollution of a public water supply.
It was brought by a public official." 4 There are too few public nuisance
cases involving percolating groundwater pollution to draw any conclusions
from a factual analysis.
VI. RuiEs ApLICpALE To UNDERGROUND STaREMs
It is a commonplace observation that underground streams" 5 are sub-
ject to the same rules as surface watercourses." 6 Cases involving pollution
of groundwater make the same general observation." 7 More to the point,
five cases involving groundwater pollution state that riparian rights law is
applicable to pollution of underground streams." 8 Three of them specifi-
cally apply surface watercourse diversion allocation rules to pollution of
112. Yommer v. McKenzie, 255 Md. 220, 224-26, 257 A.2d 138, 140-41(1969).
113. Berry v. Shell Petroleum Co., 140 Kan. 94, 83 P.2d 953 (1934), rehear-ing denied, 141 Kan. 6, 40 P.2d 359 (1935); Watson v. Great Lakes Pipeline
Co., 85 S.D. 310, 182 N.W.2d 314 (1970).
114. Barclay v. Commonwealth, 25 Pa. 503 (1855).
115. See note 123 and accompanying text infra.
116. See, e.g., Hale v. McLea, 53 Cal. 578 (1879); Saddler v. Lee, 66 Ca.
45 (1880); Jones v. Home Bldg. & Loan Assn, 252 N.C. 626, 114 S.E.2d 638(1960); Clinchfield Coal Corp. v. Compton, 148 Va. 437, 139 S.E. 308 (1927).
See also note 123 infra.
117. Killian v. Killian, 175 Ala. 224, 231, 57 So. 825, 828 (1912); Brown v.
Illius, 25 Conn. 583, 594-95 (1857) (dissent); Tampa Waterworks Co. v. Cline,
37 Fla. 586, 600-01, 20 So. 780, 784 (1896); Kevil v. Princeton, 118 S.W. 363,
365 (Ky. 1909) (by implication); Easton v. State, 153 Misc. 395, 396, 275 N.Y.S.
119, 120 (Ct. Cl. 1934), modified, 245 App. Div. 439, 283 N.Y.S. 809 (1936);
affd mem., 271 N.Y. 507, 2 N.E.2d 669 (1936); Thompson v. Board of Educ.,
124 Misc. 840, 842, 209 N.Y.S. 362, 364 (Sup. Ct. 1925); Dillon v. Acme Oil Co.,
49 Hun 565, 569, 2 N.Y.S. 289, 291 (Sup. Ct. 1888); Masten v. Texas Co., 194
N.C. 540, 542, 140 S.E. 89, 90 (1927); Good v. Altoona, 162 Pa. 493, 498, 29
A. 741, 742 (1894); Collins v. Chartiers Valley Gas Co., 131 Pa. 143, 158, 18 A.
1012, 1013 (1890); Eidemiller v. Keystone Coal & Coke Co., 15 Pa. D. & C. 759,
765, 17 West. 157, 169 (C.P. 1930); Rose v. Socony-Vacuum Corp., 54 R.I. 411,
417, 173 A. 627, 630 (1934); Atkinson v. Virginia Oil & Gas Co., 72 W. Va. 707,
709-10, 79 S.E. 647, 648 (1913) (dictum).
118. See cases listed in App. A, Pt. A infra.
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acknowledged underground streams."-9
A majority of surface watercourse pollution cases apply private
nuisance law instead of riparian rights law.1 20 Three groundwater pollution
cases state that private nuisance law applies to pollution of underground
streams.12 ' However, none applied it to that situation.
With respect to pollution of surface watercourses, I concluded from an
analysis of virutally all American, English and Irish pollution cases (445
cases) that "riparians have a legal right to discharge wastes into water-
courses, provided the discharge is reasonable with respect to other riparian
uses and provided a private or public nuisance is not created or main-
tained."122 Because an underground stream is a concentration of moving
groundwater either easily traceable or ascertainable from the surface or
known to the user,123 the problem of being unable to anticipate the effects of
119. Tampa Waterworks Co. v. Cline, 37 Fla. 586, 20 So. 780 (1896) (reason-
able use formulation of riparian rights); Kevil v. Princeton, 118 S.W. 363 (Ky.
1909) (by implication); Good v. Altoona, 162 Pa. 493, 29 A. 741 (1894)
(natural flow formulation).
120. See note 84 supra.
121. See cases listed in App. A, Pt. C infra.
There is also one case holding that negligence law is applicable to pollu-
tion of underground streams. See case listed in App. A, Pt. B infra.
122. Davis, Water Pollution Litigation 780.
123. The following groundwater pollution cases have defined an underground
stream.
Concentration of moving groundwater: This is my own definition which
reconstrues, in a modem hydrological concept, the old common-law definition of
an underground stream as encompassing a regular and constant flow within a
permanent defined channel.
Regular and constant flow: Tampa Waterworks Co. v. Cline, 37 Fla.
586, 600, 20 So. 780, 784 (1896); Easton v. State, 153 Misc. 395, 396, 275 N.Y.S.
119, 120 (Ct. CI. 1934), modified, 245 App. Div. 439, 283 N.Y.S. 809 (1936),
aff'd mem., 271 N.Y. 507, 2 N.E.2d 669 (1986); Thompson v. Board of Educ.,
124 Misc. 840, 842, 209 N.Y.S. 362, 364 (Sup. Ct. 1925); Dillon v. Acme Oil Co.,
40 Hun 565, 569, 2 N.Y.S. 289, 291 (Sup. Ct. 1888).
Permanent and defined channel: Killian v. Killian, 175 Ala. 224, 231,
57 So. 825, 828 (1912); Bellevue Cemetery Co. v. McEvers, 168 Ala. 535, 544,
53 So. 272, 275 (1910); Brown v. Illius, 25 Conn. 583, 594 (1857) (dissent);
Tampa Waterworks Co. v. Cline, 37 Fla. 586, 594, 600, 20 So. 780, 788, 784(1896); North Ga. Petroleum Co. v. Lewis, 128 Ga. App. 653, -, 197 S.E.2d
437, 439 (1973) (dictum); United Fuel Gas Co. v. Sawyers, 259 S.W.2d 466,
467 (Ky. 1953); Kinnaird v. Standard Oil Co., 89 Ky. 468, 471, 12 S.W. 937,
938 (1890); Upjohn v. Board of Health of Richland, 46 Mich. 542, 549, 9 N.W.
845, 848 (1881); Easton v. State, 153 Misc. 395, 396, 275 N.Y.S. 119, 120 (Ct.
Cl. 1934), modified, 245 App. Div. 439, 283 N.Y.S. 809 (1936), affd mer., 271
N.Y. 507, 2 N.E.2d 669 (1936); Thompson v. Board of Educ., 124 Misc. 840,
842, 209 N.Y.S. 362, 364 (Sup. Ct. 1925); Dillon v. Acme Oil Co., 49 Hun 565,
569, 2 N.Y.S. 289, 291 (Sup. Ct. 1888); Bayer v. Nello L. Teer Co., 256 N.C.
509, 517, 124 S.E.2d 552, 558 (1962); Good v. Altoona, 162 Pa. 493, 498, 29 A.
741, 741 (1894); Collins v. Chartiers Valley Gas Co., 131 Pa. 143, 158, 18 A.
1012, 1013 (1890); Eidemiller v. Keystone Coal & Coke Co., 15 Pa. D. & C.
759, 765, 17 West. 157, 169 (C.P. 1930); Rose v. Socony-Vacuum Corp., 54 R.I.
411, 417, 173 A. 627, 630 (1934); Jones v. Highland Memorial Park, 242 S.W.2d
250, 252 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951); Ballard v. Tomlinson, 29 Ch. D. 115, 125 (C.A.
1885) (per Lindley, L.J.).
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discharging wastes into an underground stream does not face the riparian
as it does the overlying landowner discharging wastes into percolating
groundwater. Therefore, there is no reason why the surface watercourse
pollution rule stated above should not apply with equal force to pollution
of underground streams. The cases are too few to ascertain whether the
courts have acted similarly in the two situations.
VII. DEFENSES
A. Comparative Convenience Doctrine
Courts frequently have applied the comparative convenience doctrine
de facto 24 to surface watercourse pollution cases, regardless of whether they
Easily traceable or ascertainable: Brown v. Illius, 25 Conn. 588, 594
(1857) (dissent); Tampa Waterworks Co. v. Cline, 87 Fla. 586, 600, 20 So.
780, 784 (1896); Good v. Altoona, 162 Pa. 498, 498, 29 A. 741, 741 (1894);
Collins v. Chartiers Valley Gas Co., 131 Pa. 143, 158, 18 A. 1012, 1018 (1890);
Eidemiller v. Keystone Coal & Coke Co., 15 Pa. D. & C. 759, 765, 17 West. 157,
169, (C.P. 1930); Rose v. Socony-Vacuum Corp., 54 R.I. 411, 417, 173 A. 627,
630 (1934).
From the surface: United Fuel Gas Co. v. Sawyers 259 S.W.2d 466, 467
(Ky. 1953).
Known to the user: Killian v. Killian, 175 Ala. 224, 281, 57 So. 825,
828 (1912); Brown v. Illius, 25 Conn. 583, 594 (1857) (dissent); Tampa Water-
works Co. v. Cline, 37 Fla. 586, 600, 20 So. 780, 784 (1896); United Fuel Gas
Co. v. Sawyers, 259 S.W.2d 466, 467 (Ky. 1953); Easton v. State, 153 Misc. 895,
396, 275 N.Y.S. 119 (Ct. Cl. 1934), modified, 245 App. Div. 439, 283 N.Y.S.
809 (1936), aff'd mem., 271 N.Y. 507, 2 N.E.2d 669 (1936); Thompson v. Board
of Educ., 124 Misc. 840, 842, 209 N.Y.S. 362, 364 (Sup. Ct. 1925); Dillon v.
Acme Oil Co., 49 Hun 565, 569, 2 N.Y.S. 289, 291 (Sup. Ct. 1888); Bayer v.
Nello L. Teer Co., 256 N.C. 509, 517, 124 S.E.2d 552, 558 (1962); Collins v.
Chartiers Valley Gas Co., 181 Pa. 143, 158, 18 A. 1012, 1018 (1890); Rose v.
Socony-Vacuum Corp., 54 R.I. 411, 417, 173 A. 627, 680 (1934).
On the definition of underground streams, see generally 6A AmRcAN
LAW OF PROPERTY § 28.65 (A.J. Casner ed. 1954); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
ToRTs Explanatory Notes § 858A at 154; § 858 A(b), comment e (Tent. Draft
No. 17, 1971); MALONEY, PLAGER & BALDWIN, WArE LAW AND ADNnNisTRA-
TION: ThE FLORIDA EXPERIENCE 150-54 (1968); W. Hurcn Ns, SELECTED P.oB-
LEMS IN THE LAW OF WATER Ricirrs IN THE WEST 152-55 (U.S. Dep't Agric.
Misc. Pub. No. 418, 1942, reprint 1971); Hanks & Hanks, The Law of Water in
New Jersey: Groundwater, 24 RuTGERs L. REv. 621, 626-27 (1970); Maloney &
Plager, Florida's Ground Water: Legal Problems in Managing a Precious Resource,
21 U. Mr'Avn L. REv. 751, 763-67 (1967); Comment, The Law of Underground
Water; A Half-Century of Huber v. Merkel, 1953 Wisc. L. REv. 491,499; Thomas,
Water Law-Groundwater Rights in Missouri-A Need for Clarification, 37 Mo. L.
REv. 857, 358 (1972).
Several hydrologists have argued that there is no such things as an
underground stream with a defined channel and definite direction except in rare
instances. See e.g., Piper & Thomas, Hydrology and Water Law: What is Their
Future Common Ground?, UNIvWsITY OF MicmGAN LAw SCHOOL, WATEB
RESotmcEs AND THE LA-w 7, 10-11 (1958); Tolman & Stipp, Analysis of Legal
Concepts of Subflow and Percolating Waters, 21 ORE. L. REv. 113, 121-24, 180-
32 (1942). The correlation between the hydrologic understanding of groundwater
movement and the legal concept of underground streams is an important matter
which warrants investigation.
124. Davis, Water Pollution Litigation 762-68, 807-09.
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formally accept or reject it. They have used it both for determining the
reasonableness of a waste discharge under riparian rights law and for
fashioning appropriate relief.1 5
For the most part the doctrine has not been considered by the courts
in groundwater pollution cases. Only four percolating groundwater pollu-
tion cases have specifically mentioned the comparative convenience doc-
trine. Three expressly rejected it in favor of private nuisance theory (two of
the three granted relief to plaintiff126 and the third favored plaintiff' 27 ).
These cases involved pollution of either domestic or industrial water sup-
plies. The fourth case favorably recited the comparative convenience doc-
trine in jury instructions which were approved per curiam. 12 1
B. Prescription
A riparian can acquire a prescriptive right against downstream ripar-
ians to discharge wastes into a surface watercourse either in abrogation
of riparian rights or to maintain a nuisance. 129 This ought to be true for
discharging wastes into groundwater aquifers as against the rights of
neighboring landowners.
One percolating groundwater pollution case expressly stated that such
a prescriptive right can be acquired, although it did not find that the
waste discharger had acquired it.'3 0 One other case expressly refused to
rule on this question.' 3 1
C. Custom of the Industry
Defendants in several negligence cases have asserted that their activities
could not be considered negligent because they were following the custom
of the industry. The percolating groundwater cases uniformly have rejected
that asserted ground for nonliability. The courts point out that the custom
itself may be negligent. 3 2 Also, in the case of mineral and oil lessees, they
125. See generally REsTATEmNT OF TonTs §§ 826-31 (1939).
126. Elliott v. Ferguson, 103 S.W. 453, 454 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907) (Qlb),
reed on other grounds 101 Tex. 317, 107 S.W. 51 (1908) (Qli*: cemetery
allegedly would pollute domestic well); Ballard v. Tomlinson, 29 Ch. D. 115, 127
(C.A. 1885) (per Lindley, L.J.) (D5ab: factory privy wastes discharged into well
polluted brewery well).
127. Schroll v. George Brown's Sons, Inc., 41 Lanc. Law Rev. 297, 300 (Pa.
C.P. 1928) (Lic: dye wastes from cesspool polluted domestic spring).
128. Wheeler v. Fisher Oil Co., 6 Ohio N.P. 309, 311, 9 Ohio Dec. 294
(1899) (Gld: oil well salt water discharged into stream percolated to and polluted
domestic well).
129. Davis, Water Pollution Litigation 758-59.
130. Millington v. Griffiths, 30 L.T.R.(n.s.) 65, 67-68 (C.P. 1874) (Kla:
gas plant residues polluted domestic well).
131. Hodge v. City of Marmaduke,- Ark. -- , 503 S.W.2d 174, 176 (1973).
182. Iverson v. Vint, 243 Iowa 949, 951, 54 N.W.2d 494, 495 (1952)
(dictum); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Alexander, 156 Tex. 455, 455, 295 S.W.2d 901, 901
1956), rev'g on this point by implication 291 S.W.2d 792, 794 (Tex. Civ. App.
1956); Brown v. Lundell, 162 Tex. 84, 90-91, 344 S.W.2d 863, 867-68 (1961),
aff'g 384 S.W.2d 616, 619 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
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have pointed out that the mineral owner's right only extends to making
reasonable use of as much of the surface as is reasonably necessary to
recover the mineral.133 That interpretation of the mineral owner's right to
use the surface does not allow the custom of the industry to be the sole
criterion of negligence.
VIII. HYDROLOGIC CoNNEcroN BETWEEN
GRO-NDWATER AND SURFACE WATERCOURSE
Most eastern states follow either the absolute ownership or "reasonable
use" rules in cases involving diversion of percolating groundwater.134 Both
permit non-malicious diversions of percolating groundwater for use on the
overlying land without incurring liability.13 5 In the general situation not
involving streamside wells, those states generally do not recognize the
hydrologic connection between percolating groundwater and surface water-
courses. Where diversions from an ordinary well (not a high capacity well)
reduce the amount of water flowing in a stream or where a stream diver-
sion depletes the percolating groundwater supply, courts in those states
tend to deny relief.18 6 Only in the few eastern states following the eastern
correlative rights rule, which employs a comparative reasonableness test, 37
are the courts likely to recognize the hydrologic connection between perco-
lating groundwater and surface watercourses.138
By contrast, most western states utilize the prior appropriation doctrine
in allocating percolating groundwater as well as water in surface water-
courses. 39 Superimposed on prior appropriation in California and Utah
is a so-called "correlative rights" rule which requires pro rata reductions in
diversions to total amounts equal to annual recharge of the aquifer. 40
These western states generally recognize the hydrologic connection between
percolating groundwater and surface watercourses and have evolved doc-
trines protecting watercourse subflow and tributary flow.1 41
133. General Crude Oil Co. v. Aiken, 162 Tex. 104, 106, 844 S.W.2d 668,
669 (1961), aff'g on this point by implication 85 S.W.2d 229, 281 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1960); Brown v. Lundell, 162 Tex. 84, 89, 844 S.W.2d 863, 866 (1961),
aff g 384 S.W.2d 616, 619 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
184. Ten jurisdictions follow the absolute ownership rule: Connecticut, the
District of Columbia, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Rhode
Island, Vermont and Wisconsin. Twelve states follow the "reasonable use" rule:
Alabama, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, New York,
North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania and West Virginia. See representative cita-
tions in Davis, Wells and Streams 288-84 nn.140-41.
185. Id. at 201-08.
186. Id. at 288.
187. Seven states follow the eastern correlative rights rule: Arkansas, Dela-
ware, Florida, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire and Tennessee. See repre-
sentative citations in id. at 284 n.142. The rule is described at id. at 208-04.
188. Id. at 284.
189. Id. at 204.
140. Id. at 208.
141. Id. at 222-27.
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The eastern states would be expected to deny relief when waste dis-
charged into one class of water pollutes a water supply drawn from another
interconnected class of water, because they generally refuse to recognize
the hydrologic connection. The western states would be expected to grant
relief in the same situation because they generally do recognize the hydro-
logic connection. The eastern cases do not substantiate the expecta-
tion-relief is granted frequently-and the western cases do substantiate
the expectation.
Two eastern cases do support the "expected" rule. They refused to grant
relief for pollution of watercourses by wastes percolating into the water-
course. Both are Pennsylvania cases involving acid mine drainage, and are
particularly favorable to the coal mining industry. 42 The earlier and prece-
dent establishing one of the two has been thoroughly discredited in other
jurisdictions. 43 Both were decided on the basis of riparian rights law and
the comparative convenience doctrine; subsequent decisions have limited
both to acid mine drainage by gravity flow. 1 44 Indeed two other Pennsyl-
vania cases have granted relief for pollution of watercourses by polluted
groundwater percolating to them. One granted relief for a public nuisance
created by acid mine drainage polluting a public water supply. 145 The
other granted relief to abate a private nuisance created by dynamite manu-
facturing wastes polluting a domestic and livestock well.146
Three eastern cases, which are not good precedent, have denied relief
for pollution of wells by oil well salt water or acid mine drainage discharged
into surface watercourses which percolated from it to the wells. One is a
per curiam approval of a jury instruction and the basis for decision is not
discussed.1 47 In another relief was denied because it was unclear whether
the plaintiff owned the land on which the polluted well was located.148 In
the third, relief was denied because proximate cause was not established.1 4 9
However, it is not clear that relief would have been denied in these cases
if an adequate factual case had been established. Much more important and
better precedent is the one eastern case granting relief for wells polluted in
the above described manner.'5 0 It involved oil well salt water and was based
on private nuisance law.
142. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. 126, 6 A. 453 (1886);
Mountain Water Supply Co. v. Sagamore Coal Co., 3 Pa. D. & C. 187 (C.P.
1922). See also Eidemiller v. Keystone Coal & Coke Co., 15 Pa. D. & C. 759,
17 West. 157 (C.P. 1930), applying the Sanderson acid mine drainage rule to
direct pollution of percolating groundwater.
143. See citations in Davis, Wells and Streams 221 n.107.
144. See principal cases cited note 113 supra, and Di Giacinto v. New Jersey
Zinc Co., 26 Leh. L.J. 247 (Pa. C. P. 1955).
145. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Sagamore Coal Co. 281 Pa. 283, 126 A. 386 (1924).
146. Rarick v. Smith, 17 Pa. County Ct. 627, 5 Pa. Dist. 530 (C.P. 1896).
147. Wheeler v. Fisher Oil Co., 6 Ohio N.P. 309, 9 Ohio Dec. 294 (1899).
148. Haynor v. Excelsior Springs Light, Power, Heat & Water Co., 129 Mo.
App. 691, 108 S.W. 580 (K.C. Ct. App. 1908).
149. Panther Coal Co. v. Looney, 185 Va. 758, 40 S.E.2d 298 (1946).
150. Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Merritt, 332 P.2d 677 (Okla. 1958).
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The best that can be said about these eastern cases is that the eastern
courts may be less reluctant to grant relief where polluted water crosses
the boundary from one class of water to another than they are to grant
relief for injurious diversions in the same situation.
Three western cases involving pollution of wells by water percolating
from a stream into which the waste had been discharged recognized the
hydrologic connection and granted relief. The source of pollution in each
was different. Two were decided under nuisance law.151 The other applied
negligence law. 52 One such western case denied relief for failure of
proof. 53 A western case involving pollution of tributary flow denied a
temporary injunction pending trial.154 Neither of them indicated any reluc-
tance to recognize the hydrologic connection in appropriate pollution cases.
Three cases recognizing the hydrologic connection were decided under
surface watercourse allocation law. One involved pollution of an under-
ground stream tributary by a surface watercourse.' 55 Another case involved
pollution of an underground stream leading from a surface watercourse.15
Both were decided on the basis of the natural flow theory which is utilized
in a small minority of riparian rights states in pollution cases. 157 The third
case involved pollution of a well by oil well salt water percolating from a
dry creek where it had been discharged. 58 It was decided on the basis of
the reasonable use theory which is utilized in the majority of those states.
IX. CONCLUSION
This article has explored the rules which the courts have used in cases
involving pollution of groundwater. Factual and doctrinal analysis reveals
several interpretations of the cases.
First, percolating groundwater allocation rules are virtually never used
in pollution cases. Instead, courts usually confine their choice to negligence
law or private nuisance law.
Second, negligence law usually is applied in two types of situations:
(1) It is applied where the polluting activity must be conducted in the
particular location because it involves exploitation of a resource located
151. Klassen v. Central Kan. Coop. Creamery Ass'n, 160 Kan. 697, 165 P.2d
601 (1946) (creamery wastes overloading city treatment plant); Atdnson v.
Herington Cattle Co., 200 Kan. 298, 436 P.2d 816 (1968) (feedlot drainage).
152. Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. Eggers, 186 Okla. 466, 98 P.2d 1114 (1940) (oil
well salt water).
153. Martin v. Continental Oil Co., 141 Kan. 37, 39 P.2d 917 (1935) (oil well
salt water).
154. Farb v. Theis, 240 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923) (cemetery
seepage).
155. Hodgkinson v. Ennor, 4 B. & S. 229, 122 Eng. Rep. 446 (Q.B. 1863).
156. Good v. Altoona, 162 Pa. 493, 29 A. 741 (1894).
157. Davis, Water Pollution Litigation 746.
158. Sun Co. v. Gibson, 295 F. 118 (5th Cir. 1923) (Tex.) Dry intermittent
streams are considered to be watercourses in the western states.
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there. Oil and gas and mineral recovery operations are typical examples.
(2) Negligence law is also applied when the activity normally is not a source
of pollution and the pollution which does occur may or may not have been
the result of an unforeseeable event. Oil pipelines and gas mains are
typical examples.
Third, nuisance law usually is applied in two situations: (1) It is
applied when the activity need not be conducted in a particular location
(and therefore has no necessary relationship to the land) and it normally
is a source of pollution or has a propensity to cause pollution. Oil refineries,
gas manufacturing plants and cemeteries are typical examples. (2) Private
nuisance law is applied where the polluter refuses to abate a source of
pollution once he is notified of its injurious consequences. Negligence law
is applied if the polluter either abates the pollution at that time or makes
a good faith attempt to abate. But the courts apply negligence and private
nuisance law about equally if the polluter merely fails to abate the pollution
once he becomes aware of its injurious consequences.
Fourth, the following factors do not affect the choice between negli-
gence and private nuisance law: (1) the classification of plaintiff and
defendant as surface owner and mineral interest owner on the one hand and
as persons without privity on the other hand; (2) the predominant economic
activity in the jurisdiction; and (3) the classification of the injury as being
a traditional nuisance or not.
Fifth, strict liability has been imposed in some jurisdictions by case
decision or statute, principally with respect to the pollution caused by the
mining, oil and gas, and manufactured gas industries.
Sixth, the eastern courts, in percolating groundwater cases, tend to
recognize the hydrologic relationship between surface watercourses and
groundwater and to grant relief for pollution of one by an activity affecting
the other, slightly more often than they do in diversion cases of that type.
The western courts generally recognize the hydrologic connection and grant
relief in most cases, both pollution and diversion.
These common law rules concerning groundwater pollution are no
longer appropriate to the needs of the time. With the demand for use of
groundwater growing rapidly, the liability imposed for its pollution should
be broadened to the limits presently applied to pollution of surface water-
courses. Under no circumstances should the courts continue to permit the
creation and maintenance of some nuisances without liability. Today
polluting activities which have a necessary relationship to the land, such
as mines and oil wells, and activities which do not normally cause
pollution, such as a pipeline, are permitted to create a nuisance without
liability provided there is no negligence. This is no longer a viable rule.
Also, there should be liability even when the polluter promptly abates the
source of the pollution upon notice of the injurious consequences of his
activity. In many such cases, the effects of the initial pollution may linger
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for years. 59 Liability for nuisance should always be imposed regardless of
the predictability of the pollution and regardless of the relationship of the
polluting activity to its location. Such liability presently exists for polluting
activities affecting surface watercourses and should exist for polluting
activities affecting groundwater.
A polluter should not be absolved from liability just because he may
not be able to anticipate the movement of the polluted groundwater he
created. This defense should not be recognized for several reasons. First, the
hydrology of groundwater movement is much better understood now than it
was when many of the early groundwater pollution cases were decided. 60
Even though precise mapping of groundwater movement in any particular
location is still expensive,161 it is within the reach of any major waste
producer which proposes to inject wastes underground. Disposal wells need
porous formations for successful waste injection and the appropriate hydrol-
ogic tests would insure a successful injection well. Therefore, persons deliber-
ately disposing of wastes underground ought to be required to act in
accordance with the information gained by such testing regarding the
movement of the injected wastes and their probable effects on neighboring
groundwater uses. If they do not make such tests, they should be charged
with the information they would have gained had they made them. Second,
it is generally known now that liquids placed on the ground will seep into
the soil and may enter the body of groundwater percolating beneath the
surface. Persons causing groundwater pollution in ways, other than by
deliberate underground disposal, should be charged with such knowledge
and should not be insulated from liability for groundwater pollution by
claiming that they know nothing more about groundwater movement than
was known in 1843 when Acton v. Blundell 62 was decided. Although a
159. Pollution lingered long after abatement of the polluting source in the
following cases: Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Bennett, 123 F.2cd 884 (6th Cir. 1941)
(Tenn.) (service station gasoline leak); Alliston v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 143
Kan. 827, 55 P.2d 896 (1986) (deep well injection of oil well salt water);
Spencer v. Derby Oil Co., 140 Kan. 657, 37 P.2d 991 (1934) (oil pipeline leak);
Nelson v. C & C Plywood Corp., 154 Mont. 414, 465 P.2d 814 (1970) (phenols
in glue wastes discharged in drainage ditch); Pickens v. Harrison, 151 Tex. 562,
252 S.W.2d 575, modifying 246 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) (oil well salt
water in disposal pit); Geochemical Surveys v. Dietz, 340 S.W.2d 114 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1960) (oil well salt water in disposal pit); Continental Oil Co. v. Berry, 52
S.W.2d 953 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) (service station gasoline leak).
160. The science of hydrology was formulated about 1923 and the current
theory of groundwater movement was first studied extensively about 1940.
0. MEINZER, THE OCCURRENCE oF GnouNn WATER iN THE UNrrED STATEs (1928);
0. MEInZER, OUTLiNE OF GRoUND WATER HYDROLOGY, WIT DEFINITIONS
(1923); Hubbert, The, Theory of Ground-Water Motion, 48 J. GEOL. 785 (1940).
161. The two major groundwater movement testing methods involve (1)
drilling test wells and measuring change of water levels before, during and after
pumping, and (2) injection of tracing dyes or radioactive materials. See Davis,
Wells and Streams 235 n.144 and treatises cited therein.
162. 12 M. & W. 324, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (Ex. 1843). This was the first
case to set forth the absolute ownership rule. It relied heavily on the landowner's
inability to determine what happens to water after it seeps into the ground.
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particular polluter might still legitimately claim he could not predict
particular injurious consequences of his activity, he can no longer claim
legitimately that the polluting material vanished from the earth once it
seeped beneath the surface. He knows it will go somewhere. Such a defense
to nuisance liability is not recognized in surface watercourse and air pollu-
tion cases. Groundwater pollution cases should not recognize it either.1
Pollution of a groundwater aquifer may have pervasive effects both in
terms of territorial extent and duration. With reliance on our groundwater
supplies increasing, the old court-made rules concerning groundwater pollu-
tion are no longer adequate. I propose the following basis for liability in
groundwater pollution cases.
(1) No person should be permitted to create or maintain a nuisance
without liability. A nuisance contemplates traditional types of nuisances,
such as pollution of domestic and livestock water supplies, poisoning of the
soil and creation of odors affecting habitation or places of work. A nuisance
also contemplates a refusal to abate an activity polluting groundwater after
notice of substantial injurious consequences has been given.
(2) No person should be permitted to pollute groundwater as a result
of a negligent act without liability.
(3) Where groundwater pollution causes an injury which does not
constitute a nuisance and is not the result of negligence, liability should be
imposed on the basis of the eastern correlative rights rule. This rule employs
a comparative reasonableness test. The courts should consider the ability of
the polluter to predict the injurious consequences in advance, the degree and
duration of the injury, the difficulty of abating the polluting source, the
willingness of the polluter to abate to a reasonable extent, and the compara-
tive social and economic utility of the litigants' activities. These factors
should affect both liability in the first instance and the degree of liability
in the same manner they affect the reasonable use test employed in
riparian rights and surface watercourse pollution cases. The advantage of
this test is that the calculations which it requires can be adjusted to reflect
both improving knowledge about groundwater hydrology and pollution in
general and also known local conditions concerning groundwater movement
and pollution.'"
(4) Strict liability for escape of abnormally dangerous substances
should be imposed where considered appropriate under court-made law
or by statute.
These rules would restrain pollution of our groundwater resources to a
greater extent than the present court-made rules do. They should obviate
163. The most recent tentative revision of the Restatement of Torts would
deny liability for non-intentional discharges which create nuisances. RESTATE-
MENT (SEcoND) OF TonTS § 822 (Tent. Draft No. 16, 1970), discussed in text
accompanying notes 86-104 supra.
164. This rule is compatible with the rule I proposed for groundwater diver-
sions in Davis, Wells and Streams 236-38.
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the need for tight statutory regulation of groundwater use in areas of
moderate demand. They would more accurately reflect hydrologic principles.
Lastly, they would more nearly equate groundwater pollution law and
surface watercourse pollution law and would provide a common standard
of behavior for users of the two major sources of water.
APPENDICES
CODINGS FOR CASE CLASSIFICATION APPENDICES
A. Fact situation coding:
1. SOURCE OF POLLUTION
A: domestic sewage, septic tank, or cesspool
B: sewage from city sewers
C: effluent from city treatment plant
D: domestic waste discharge from industrial plant or other collective
source
E: mining or mine drainage
F: mine tailings or process washings
G: oil and brine from oil wells
H: leaks from refinery, distributor or large user
I: leaks from pipelines or gas mains
J: leaks from service stations or small users
K: gas plant residues
L: other industrial or chemical wastes
M: farm animal wastes or feedlot drainage
N: landfill, dirt or sand
P: storm drainage
Q: cemetery
R: other or not stated
2. RESULTS OF POLLUTION
1: domestic water supply affected
2: public water supply affected
3: livestock water supply affected
4: irrigation water supply affected
5: industrial or commercial water supply affected
6: odors interfered with habitation
7: odors interfered with industrial or commercial establishment
B. Decision Coding:
1. JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFF
a: damages granted
b: injunction granted
c: demurrer, motion to dismiss, or motion for directed verdict overruled
2. JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT
d: not entitled to relief under rule
e: allegations not proved or causal connection not proved
f: no damage or abatement achieved





*: defendant caused pollution
The coding from the above listing is inserted after each case citation in the follow-
ing appendices. E.g., Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. Eggers, 186 Okla. 466, 98 P.2d
1114 (1940) (Gla). "Gla7 means brine from an oil well polluted a domestic well
and damages were granted to plaintiff.
1974]




(Cases preceded by an asterisk * applied
those rules to acknowledged underground streams.)
A. Surface Watercourse Rule
Cases holding that surface watercourse pollution rules govern pollution of
underground streams are listed below.
FLORIDA: *Tampa Waterworks Co. v. Cline, 37 Fla. 586, 20 So. 780 (1896)
(R2e: bathing pit allegedly would pollute municipal well) (reasonable use).
KENTUCKY: *Kevil v. Princeton, 118 S.W. 863 (Ky. 1909) (by implication)
(B2a: city sewage polluted public water supply).
NORTH CAROLINA: Masten v. Texas Co., 194 N.C. 540, 140 S.E. 89 (1927)
(JIc: service station gasoline leak polluted domestic well).
PENNSYLVANIA: *Good v. Altoona, 162 Pa. 493, 29 A. 741 (1894) (Bl,3a:
city sewage discharged into river polluted domestic and livestock springs fed by
underground stream leaving river) (natural flow).
RHODE ISLAND: Rose v. "Socony-Vacuum Corp., 54 R.I. 411, 173 A. 627
(1934) (dictum) (H1,3d: gasoline from refinery polluted domestic and livestock
well) (reasonable use).
B. Negligence Rule
Cases holding that negligence rules apply to pollution of underground streams
are listed below.
CONNECTICUT: Brown & Bros. v. Illius, 27 Conn. 84 (1858) (K5i: gas plant
residues polluted industrial well).
C. Nuisance Rule
Cases holding that nuisance rules apply to pollution of underground streams
are listed below.
CONNECTICUT: Swift & Co. v. Peoples Coal & Gas Co., 121 Conn. 579, 186 A.
629 (1936) (H7c: fuel oil from dealership travelled through groundwater to base-
ment warehouse).
NORTH CAROLINA: Masten v. Texas Co., 194 N.C. 540, 140 S.E. 89 (1927)
(by implication) (JIc: service station gasoline leak polluted domestic well).
TENNESSEE: Love v. Nashville Agricultural & Normal Institute, 146 Tenn. 550,
243 S.W. 804 (1922) (D5b: school sewage discharged into underground channel
polluted a medicinal bottling works spring).
APPENDIX B
PERCOLATING GROUNDWATER CASES
A. Percolating Groundwater Allocation Rules
Listed below are cases holding that percolating groundwater allocation rules
concerning diversions also govern pollution of percolating groundwater and negli-
gence or nuisance are not mentioned as exceptions to the rule.
1. ABSOLUTE OWNERSHIP RULE
INDIANA: Greencastle v. Hazelett, 23 Ind. 186 (1864) (Qli: cemetery seepage
allegedly would pollute domestic well).
2. REASONABLE USE RULE
None.
3. EASTERN CORRELATIVE RIGHTS RULE
VIRGINIA: Panther Coal Co. v. Looney, 185 Va. 758, 40 S.E.2d 298 (1946)(Ele: acid mine wastes discharged into stream polluted its water and percolation
from it polluted domestic well).
4. WESTERN "CORRELATIVE RIGHTS" RULE
None.
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5. PRIOR APPROPRIATION RULE
None.
B. Negligence Exception to Allocation Rules
Listed below are cases holding that liability is imposed for negligent activities
causing percolating groundwater pollution, and that in the absence of negligence,
liability is determined on the basis of the percolating groundwater allocation rules.
1. ABSOLUTE OWNERSHIP RULE
CONNECTICUT: Brown & Bros. v. Illius, 27 Conn. 84 (1858) (K5i: gas plant
residues polluted industrial well).
MICHIGAN: Upjohn v. Board of Health of Richland, 46 Mich. 542, 9 N.W. 845(1881) (Qle: cemetery seepage allegedly would pollute domestic well).
NEW YORK: Dillon v. Acme Oil Co., 49 Hun 565, 2 N.Y.S. 289 (Sup. Ct. 1888)(Hld: refinery residues polluted domestic well); Thompson v. Board of Educ.,
124 Misc. 840, 209 N.Y.S. 862 (Sup. Ct. 1925) (D3d: school cesspool polluted
livestock well); Easton v. State, 158 Misc. 895, 275 N.Y.S. 119 (Ct. Cl. 1934),
modified, 245 App. Div. 489, 283 N.Y.S. 809, aff'd mem., 271 N.Y. 507, 2 N.E.2d
669 (1936) (Pid: street storm drainage discharged onto land overlying aquifer
polluted domestic spring); Phillips v. Sun Oil Co., 307 N.Y. 328, 121 N.E.2d
249 (1954) (by implication) (Jie: service station gasoline leak allegedly polluteddomestic well).
RHODE ISLAND: Rose v. Socony-Vacuum Corp., 54 R.I. 411, 178 A. 627 (1984)(H1,Sd: gasoline from refinery polluted domestic and livestock well); Rose v.
Standard Oil Co., 56 R.I. 272, 185 A. 251 (1936) (H1,8c: same facts as above).
2. REASONABLE USE RULE
GEORGIA: North Ga. Petroleum Co. v. Lewis, 128 Ga. App. 653, 197 S.E.2d
437 (1973) (J1,8a: service station gasoline leak polluted domestic and livestock
well).
KENTUCKY: United Fuel Gas Co. v. Sawyers, 259 S.W.2d 466 (Ky. 1958)(Gld: gas well leak polluted domestic well).
NORTH CAROLINA: Bayer v. Nello L. Teer Co., 256 N.C. 509, 124 S.E.2d
552 (1962) (Eld: quarry dewatering lowered water table in and caused sea water
to intrude by percolation into domestic well).
PENNSYLVANIA: Collins v. Chartiers Valley Gas Co., 181 Pa. 143, 18 A. 1012(1890) (GIc: gas well salt water polluted domestic well); Collins v. Chartiers
Valley Gas Co., 139 Pa. 111, 21 A. 147 (1891) (Gla: same facts as above);
Schlichtkrull v. Mellon-Pollock Oil Co. (No. 1), 301 Pa. 558, 152 A. 829 (1930)(Gla: oil well salt water polluted domestic well); Eidemiller v. Keystone Coal &
Coke Co., 15 Pa. D. & C. 759, 17 West. 157 (C.P. 1980) (Eld: mine drainage
polluted domestic spring).
Pennsylvania abandoned the common law negligence rule in 1954 and since
has followed the RiSTATEMENT rule.
8. EASTERN CORRELATIVE RIGHTS RULE
KENTUCKY: North-East Coal Co. v. Hayes, 244 Ky. 639, 51 S.W.2d 960 (1932)(E1,Sd: mining polluted domestic and livestock well) (but see United Fuel Gas
Co. v. Sawyers, supra.).
NEW JERSEY: P. Ballantine & Sons v. Public Serv. Corp., 86 N.J.L. 881, 91 A.
95 (1914) (K5a: gas plant residues polluted brewery well).
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Listed below are cases applying negligence rules to pollution of percolating
groundwater without mentioning application of percolating groundwater alloca-
tion rules in the absence of negligence.
ALABAMA: H.W. Peerson Drilling Co. v. Scoggins, 261 Ala. 284, 74 So. 2d 450(1954) (Gla: oil well casing leak polluted domestic well).
ALASKA: Trillingham v. Alaska Housing Authority, 109 F. Supp. 924 (D. Alas.
1953) (Dli: housing development sewage polluted domestic well).
ARKANSAS: Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Smith, 152 Ark. 326, 238 S.W. 56(1922) (Hli*: distributor gasoline leak polluted domestic well); O'Brien v.
Primm, 243 Ark. 186, 419 S.W.2d 323 (1967) (Gla: oil well salt water in
disposal pit polluted domestic well after hydraulic well fracturing operation
disturbed intervening strata).
CALIFORNIA: Donahue v. Stockton Gas & Elec. Co., 6 Cal. App. 276, 92 P.
196 (1907) (Klc: gas plant residues and vapors polluted domestic well, poisoned
soil and created noxious odors in house).
COLORADO: Adams v. Weingarten, 156 Colo. 402, 899 P.2d 774 (1965) (Mle:
farmpond seepage allegedly polluted domestic well).
CONNECTICUT: Brown v. Illius, 25 Conn. 583 (1857) (K5a: gas plant residues
polluted industrial well); Swift & Co. v. Peoples Coal & Gas Co., 121 Conn. 579,
186 A. 629 (1936) (dictum) (H7c: fuel oil from dealership travelled through
groundwater to basement warehouse); Kostyal v. Cass, 163 Conn. 92, 302 A.2d
121 (1972) (Jla: heating oil storage tank leak polluted domestic well).
FLORIDA: Pensacola Gas Co. v. Pebley, 25 Fla. 881, 5 So. 593 (1889) (KIa:
gas plant residues polluted domestic well).
ILLINOIS: Phoenix v. Graham, 849 Ill. App. 326, 110 N.E.2d 669 (1958) (as
between holders of surface and mineral interests) (Gli*: salt water leak from
plugged oil well polluted domestic well); Van Brocklin v. Gudema, 50 Ill. App. 2d
20, 199 N.E.2d 457 (1964) (Mla: manure pile seepage polluted domestic well).
KANSAS: Poizin v. National Co-op. Refinery Ass'n, 175 Kan. 531, 266 P.2d 293
(1954) (Gle: salt water injected by disposal well leaked past improperly cased
oil well and polluted domestic well).
KENTUCKY: Long v. Lousiville & N.R.R., 128 Ky. 26, 107 S.W. 203 (1908)
(RIc: buried cow polluted domestic well); Wynn v. Wilson, 252 Ky. 352, 67
S.W.2d 483 (1984)(G~e: salt water from plugged oil well allegedly polluted
livestock well).
LOUISIANA: Monroe "66" Oil Co. v. Hightower, 180 So. 2d 8 (La. App. 1965)
(J5a: service station gasoline leak from storage tank installed by distributor
polluted station owner's restaurant well).
MAINE: Woodward v. Aborn, 35 Me. 271 (1858) (Mla: manure pile seepage
polluted domestic well).
MASSACHUSETTS: Ficociello v. Spencer Gas Co., 261 Mass. 77, 158 N.E. 263
(1927) (Ile: gas main leak killed trees and polluted domestic well); Gauvreau v.
Gulf Ref. Co., 288 Mass. 54, 192 N.E. 220 (1934) (Jld: service station gasoline
leak polluted domestic well).
MICHIGAN: Joldersma v. Muskegon Dev. Co., 286 Mich. 520, 282 N.W. 229
(1988) (Gle: oil well salt water allegedly polluted domestic spring and poisoned
soil).
MISSISSIPPI: Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Williams, 222 Miss. 588, 76 So. 2d
865 (1954) (GJ,3e: oil well salt water discharged into disposal pit allegedly
polluted domestic and livestock well).
MISSOURI: Haynor v. Excelsior Springs Light, Power, Heat & Water Co., 129
Mo. App. 691, 108 S.W. 580 (K.C. Ct. App. 1908) (dictum) (HIk: oil and grease
escaping into creek polluted domestic well); Shelley v. Ozark Pipe Line Corp.,
247 S.W. 472 (Spr. Mo. App. 1928) (Ila: pipeline leak polluted domestic well);
Chapman v. American Creosoting Co., 220 Mo. App. 419, 286 S.W. 887 (Spr.
Ct. App. 1926) (L1,3i: creosote escaping into ditch saturated ground and polluted
domestic well); Shelley v. Ozark Pipe Line Corp., 2 S.W.2d 115 (Spr. Mo. App.
1927), rev'd on other grounds, 327 Mo. 238, 37 S.W.2d 518 (1931) (Ilk: same
facts as above); Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v. Decker, 32 F.2d 66 (8th Cir. 1929)
(I1,3j: oil pipeline leak polluted domestic and livestock well); Bollinger v.
Mungle, 175 S.W.2d 912 (St. L. Mo. App. 1943) (Jld: service station gasoline
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leak polluted domestic well); Reddick v. Pippin, 421 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. 1967)
(Cle: sewage lagoon overflow allegedly polluted domestic well).
NEW JERSEY: P. Ballantine & Sons v. Public Serv. Corp., 76 N.J.L. 358, 70 A.
167 (1908) (K5a: gas plant residues polluted brewery well); De Feo v. People's
Gas Co., 6 N.J. Misc. 790, 142 A. 756 (Sup. Ct. 1928) (Ila: gas main leak polluted
domestic well).
NEW YORK: Elsey v. Adirondack & St. L.R.R., 97 Misc. 273, 161 N.Y.S. 391
(Sup. Ct. 1916) (N1,3b: embankment of pyrite tailings polluted domestic and
livestock spring); Easton v. State, 245 App. Div. 439, 283 N.Y.S. 809 (1936),
modifying 153 Misc. 395, 275 N.Y.S. 119 (Ct. Cl. 1934), affd mem., 271 N.Y.
507, 2 N.E.2d 669 (1936) (Pld: street storm drainage discharged onto land over-
lying aquifer polluted domestic spring).
OHIO: Wheeler v. Fisher Oil Co., 6 Ohio N.P. 309, 9 Ohio Dec. 294 (1899)
(jury instruction) (Gid: oil well salt water discharged into stream percolated to
and polluted domestic well); Sinclair ~ef. Co. v. Keister, 64 F.2d 537 (6th Cir.1933) (Jia: service station gasoline leak polluted domestic well).
OKLAHOMA: Pine v. Rizzo, 186 Okla. 35, 96 P.2d 17 (1939) (li: oil well salt
water polluted domestic well); Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. Eggers, 186 Okla. 466,
98 P.2d 1114 (1940) (Gla: oil well salt water discharged into creek percolated
to and polluted domestic well); Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Blubaugh, 187 Okla.
198, 102 P.2d 163 (1940) (O~e: salt water from plugged oil well allegedly
polluted livestock well); Sheridan Oil Co. v. Wall, 187 Ola. 398, 103 P.2d 507(1940) (Gi,Sa: salt water from plugged oil well polluted domestic and livestock
well); Harper-Turner Oil Co. v. Bridge, 811 P.2d 947 (Okla. 1957) (Gla: salt
water from plugged oil well polluted domestic well); Cities Serv. Oil Co. v.
Merritt, 832 P.2d 677 (Okla. 1958) (dictum: as between holders of surface and
mineral interests) (Gla: oil well salt water discharged into stream percolated into
and polluted domestic well); Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. Tisdale, 866 P.2d
614 (Okla. 1961) (Gla: salt water from improperly plugged exploratory well
polluted domestic well); Norman v. Greenland Drilling Co., 403 P.2d 507
(Okla. 1965) (G3c: salt water from improperly cemented oil well polluted live-
stock well and spring).
PENNSYLVANIA: Steele v. Todd, 158 Pa. 515, 27 A. 942 (1893) (dictum);
Denniston v. Philadelphia Co., 161 Pa. 41, 28 A. 1007 (1894) (Ij: gas main
leak polluted livestock spring); McNary v. Southwest Pa. Pipe Lines, 84 Pa.
County Ct. 441, 17 Pa. Dist. 847 (C.P. 1908) (le: pipeline leak allegedly
polluted domestic well); Vandivort v. Hunter, 265 Pa. 585 109 A. 479 (1920)(Al*: cesspool polluted domestic spring); Tolatti v. Enama, 26 Luz. L. Reg.
Rep. 844 (Pa. C.P. 1931)(Aid: cesspool polluted domestic well); Meddock v.
National Transit Co., 105 Pa. Super. 553, 161 A. 628 (1932) (Ila: pipeline
leak polluted domestic well); Ressler v. Gerlach, i89 Pa. Super. 192, 149 A.2d
158 (1959) (Did: apartment building sewage polluted domestic well).
Pennsylvania abandoned the common law negligence rule in 1954 and since
has followed the RESTATEMENT rule.
RHODE ISLAND: Gagnon v. Landry, 103 R.I. 45, 234 A.2d 674 (1967) (Ald:
septic tank polluted domestic well).
TENNESSEE: Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Bennett, 128 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1941) (Jia:
service station gasoline leak polluted domestic well).
TEXAS: Pickens v. Harrison, 151 Tex. 562, 252 S.W.2d 575, modifying 246
S.W.2d 816 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) (G4a: oil well salt water in disposal pit
polluted irrigation well); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Alexander, 291 S.W.2d 792 (Tex.
Civ. App.) (dictum), affd per curiam, 156 Tex. 455, 295 S.W.2d 901 (1956)(direct holding) (G4a: oil well salt water in disposal pit polluted irrigation well);
Humble Pipe Line Co. v. Anderson, 339 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960)
(Ild: pipeline leak polluted domestic well); Geochemical Surveys v. Dietz,
840 S.W.2d 114 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960) (Gla: oil well salt water in disposal pit
polluted domestic well); General Crude Oil' Co. v. Aiken, 162 Tex. 104, 344
S.W.2d 668 (1961) (Gi,3a), rev'g 835 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960)
(GI,3k*: oil well salt water in disposal pit polluted livestock spring); Brown v.
Lundell, 162 Tex. 84, 344 S.W.2d 863 (1961), affg 334 S.W.2d 616 (Tex. Civ.
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App. 1960) (G4a: oil well salt water in disposal pit polluted irrigation well);
Crawford v. Yeatts, 895 S.W.2d 418 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) (Gla: oil well salt
water in disposal pit polluted domestic well and poisoned soil).
UTAH: Petersen v. Cache County Drainage Dist. No. 5, 77 Utah 256, 294 P.
289 (1930) (Rld: irrigation canal water polluted domestic well).
VERMONT: Randall v. Clifford, 119 Vt. 216, 122 A.2d 833 (1956) (R1,3c:
buried cow polluted domestic and livestock spring).
WEST VIRGINIA: Atkinson v. Virginia Oil & Gas Co., 72 W.Va. 707, 79 S.E.
647 (1913) (dictum); McCoy v. Cohen, 149 W.Va. 197, 140 S.E.2d 427 (1965)
(Gle: gas well hydraulic fracturing fluid allegedly polluted domestic well).
ENGLAND: Norton v. Scholefield, 9 M. & W. 665, 152 Eng. Rep. 281 (Ex.
1842) (Ali: cesspool polluted domestic well).
CANADA: Bennett v. Imperial Oil Ltd., 28 D.L.R.2d 55 (Newf. 1961) (Jla:
service station gasoline leak polluted domestic well).
D. Nuisance
1. PUBLIC NUISANCE
Listed below are cases apply public nuisance rules to pollution of percolating
groundwater.
KANSAS: Berry v. Shell Petroleum Co., 140 Kan. 94, 88 P.2d 953 (1934),
rehearing denied, 141 Kan. 6, 40 P.2d 859 (1935) (Gla: oil well salt water
discharged into drainage canal percolated to and polluted domestic wells).
PENNSYLVANIA: Barclay v. Commonwealth, 25 Pa. 503 (1855) (M2a: manure
and hay seepage polluted public water supply spring).
SOUTH DAKOTA: Watson v. Great Lakes Pipeline Co., 85 S.D. 810, 182
N.W.2d 314 (1970) (Hia: petroleum tank farm seepage polluted domestic wells).
2. PRIVATE NUISANCE
Listed below are cases applying private nuisance rules to pollution of perco-
lating groundwater.
ALABAMA: Kingsbury v. Flowers, 65 Ala. 479 (1880) (Qle: cemetery allegedly
would pollute domestic well); Bellevue Cemetery Co. v. McEvers, 168 Ala. 535,
53 So. 272 (1910) (Qle: cemetery seepage allegedly would pollute domestic
well).
ARKANSAS: McDaniel v. Forrest Park Cemetery Co., 156 Ark. 571, 246 S.W.
874 (1928) (Qle: cemetery seepage allegedly would pollute domestic wells);
Hodge v. Marmaduke, - Ark. -, 503 S.W.2d 174 (1978) (C1,8e: treated
effluent from city treatment plant allegedly polluted domestic and livestock well).
CALIFORNIA: Carter v. Chotiner, 210 Cal. 288, 291 P. 577 (1980) (Q1,3b:
cemetery seepage would pollute domestic and livestock well).
CONNECTICUT: Brown v. Illius, 25 Conn. 583 (1857) (K5a: gas plant residues
polluted industrial well); Swift & Co. v. Peoples Coal & Gas Co., 121 Conn. 579,
186 A. 629 (1936) (H7c: fuel oil from dealership traveled through groundwater
to basement warehouse); Kostyal v. Cass, 163 Conn. 92, 302 A.2d 121 (1972)
(Jla: heating oil storage tank leak polluted domestic well).
GEORGIA: Harper v. Nashville, 136 Ga. 141, 70 S.E. 1102 (1911) (Qle:
cemetery allegedly would pollute domestic well).
ILLINOIS: Ottawa Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Thompson, 39 Ill. 599 (1864) (Kle:
gas plant residues polluted domestic well); Wahle v. Reinback, 76 Ill. 822 (1875)
(Alb: privy allegedly would pollute domestic well); Rand v. Wilber, 19 Inl. App.
895 (1886 (Alb: privy allegedly would pollute domestic well); Iliff v. School
Directors, 45 InI. App. 419 (1892) (Die: school privy allegedly would pollute
domestic well); Phoenix v. Graham, 849 Ill. App. 326, 110 N.E.2d 669 (1953)
(dictum (negligence law applied as between holders of surface and mineral
interests ( 0 : salt water leak from plugged oil well polluted domestic well).
IOWA:Payne v. Wayland, 131 Iowa 659, 109 N.W. 203 (1906) (Qlb: ceme-
4ery seepage allegedly would pollute domestic well and spring); Iverson v. Vint,
243 Iowa 949, 54 N.W.2d 494 (1952) (Lla: molasses waste dumped in highway
drainage ditch polluted domestic well).
KANSAS: Gilmore v. Royal Salt Co., 84 Kan. 729, 115 P. 541 (1911) (R3c: out-
door salt pile seepage polluted livestock spring and poisoned soil); Helms v.
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Eastern Kan. Oil Co., 102 Kan. 164, 169 P. 208 (1917) (dictum); Hall v. Galey,
126 Kan. 699, 271 P. 319 (1928) (G1,3,4a: gas well salt water polluted domestic,
livestock, and irrigation well); Berry v. Shell Petroleum Co., 140 Kan. 94, 83 P.2d
953 (1934), rehearing denied, 141 Kan. 6, 40 P.2d 359 (1935) (dictum) (Gla:
oil well salt water discharged into drainage canal percolated to and polluted
domestic wells); Klassen v. Central Kan. Coop. Creamery Ass'n, 160 Kan. 697,
165 P.2d 601 (1946) (L~a: creamery wastes discharged into city sewer overloaded
city treatment plant; sewage discharged by city polluted receiving stream; stream
water percolated to and polluted livestock well); Atkinson v. Herington Cattle
Co., 200 Kan. 298, 436 P.2d 816 (1968) (M~a: feedlot drainage discharged into
stream polluted stream water which percolated to livestock well).
KENTUCKY: Kinnaird v. Standard Oil Co., 89 Ky. 468, 12 S.W. 987 (1890)(Hl,8a: oil tank leak polluted domestic and livestock spring); Miley v. A'Hearn,
13 Ky. L.R. 834, 18 S.W. 529 (1892) (Alb: privy allegedly would pollute domes-
tic well); Livezey v. Schmidt, 96 Ky. 441, 29 S.W. 25 (1895) (M6j: manure
pile seepage allegedly percolated to house cellar during rains); Louisville &
N.R.R. v. Simpson, 17 Ky. L.R. 989, 83 S.W. 395 (1895) (Rla: buried cow
polluted domestic spring); Davis v. Adkins, 18 Ky. L.R. 73, 35 S.W. 271 (Ky.
1896) (Ale: privy allegedly would pollute domestic spring); Rogers v. Bond
Bros., 279 Ky. 239, 130 S.W.2d 22 (1939) (L2e: creosote allegedly polluted
public water supply well); McCaw v. Harrison, 259 S.W.2d 457 (Ky. 1953) (QOe:
cemetery seepage allegedly would pollute livestock well).
MAINE: Monk v. Packard, 71 Me. 309 (1880) (QIe: cemetery seepage allegedly
polluted domestic well).
MASSACHUSETTS: Call v. Buttrick, 58 Mass. (4 Cush.) 345 (1849) (Alc: cess-
pool polluted domestic well); Sherman v. Fall River Iron Works Co., 84 Mass.(2 Allen) 524 (1861) (L~c: gas main leak polluted livestock well); Sherman v.
Fall River Iron Works, 87 Mass. (5 Allen) 213 (1862) (L3j*: same facts as
above); Ball v. Nye, 99 Mass. 582 (1868)(M1,6a: manure seepage polluted
domestic well and caused odors in house cellar); Mears v. Dole, 185 Mass. 508
(1883) (Rlab: removal of beach caused sea water to percolate into domestic
well).
MICHIGAN: Upjohn v. Board of Health, 46 Mich. 542, 9 N.W. 845 (1881)
(Qle: cemetery seepage allegedly would pollute domestic well).
MINNESOTA: Berger v. Minneapolis Gaslight Co., 60 Minn. 296, 62 N.W. 836
(1895) (KIa: gas plant fuel oil seepage polluted domestic well); Nelson v.
Swedish Evangelical Lutheran Cemtery Ass'n, 111 Minn. 149, 126 N.W. 723,
petition for reargument denied, 127 N.W. 626 (1910) (Qlc: cemetery seepage
allegedly would pollute domestic well).
MISSOURI: Haynor v. Excelsior Springs Light, Power, Heat & Water Co. 129
Mo. App. 691, 108 S.W. 580 (K.C. Ct. App. 1908) (Hlk: oil and grease escap-
ing into creek polluted domestic well); Shelley v. Ozark Pipe Line Corp., 327
Mo. 238, 87 S.W.2d 518 (1931), rev'g 2 S.W.2d 115 (Spr. Mo. App. 1927)
(Ila: pipeline leak polluted domestic well).
NEBRASKA: Beatrice Gas Co. v. Thomas, 41 Neb. 662, 59 N.W. 925 (1894)
(K1,3i*: gas plant residues polluted domestic and livestock well); Lowe v. Pros-
pect Hill Cemetery Assn, 58 Neb. 94, 78 N.W. 488 (1899) (Qlb: cemetery
seepage allegedly would pollute domestic well); Braasch v. Cemetery Ass'n, 69
Neb. 300, 95 N.W. 646 (1903) (Qle: cemetery seepage allegedly would pollute
domestic well).
NEVADA: Czipott v. Fleigh, 87 Nev. 496, 489 P.2d 681 (1971) (Mlb: horses
in pasture allegedly would pollute domestic well).
NORTH CAROLINA: Clark v. Lawrence, 59 N.C. 83 (1860) (Qlc: cemetery
seepage allegedly would pollute domestic well); Masten v. Texas Co., 194 N.C.
540, 140 S.E. 89 (1927) (JIc: service station gasoline leak polluted domestic
well).
OHIO: Columbus Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Freeland, 12 Ohio St. 392 (1861)
(Ki: gas plant residues polluted domestic well); Bassett v. Osborn, 23 Ohio
C.C.R. (n.s.) 842, 84 Ohio C.C. Dec. 284 (1912) (Alb: cesspool polluted domes-
tic well).
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OKLAHOMA: Clinton Cemtery Ass'n v. McAttee, 27 Okla. 160, 111 P. 892
(1910) (Qle: cemetery allegedly would pollute domestic cistern); Danciger Oil
& Ref. Co. v. Donahey, 205 Okla. 890, 238 P.2d 308 (1951) (G1,3a: oil well
salt water and refuse discharged into dry stream percolated into and polluted
domestic and livestock well); Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Merritt, 332 P.2d 677 (Okla.
1958) (but negligence law applied as between holders of surface and mineral
interests (dictum)) (Gla: oil well salt water discharged into stream percolated
into and polluted domestic well).
OREGON: Ex parte Wygant, 89 Ore. 429, 64 P. 867 (1901) (dictum); Ulmen v.
Mt. Angel, 57 Ore. 547, 112 P. 529 (1911) (BPlb: sewer and storm drainage
polluted domestic well).
PENNSLYVANIA: Shuter v. The City, 3 Phila. (Pa.). 228 (Dist. Ct. 1858) (Kla:
gas plant reservoir leak polluted domestic well); Pottstown Gas Co. v. Murphy,
39 Pa. 257 (1861) (Kla: gas plant residues polluted domestic well); Haugh's
Appeal, 102 Pa. 42, 2 Walk 376 (1882) (Alb: privy and cesspool polluted domes-
tic well); Briegel v. Philadephia, 135 Pa. 451, 19 A. 1038 (1890) (D6a: schoolprivy wastes seeped into cellar); Hauck v. Tide Water Pipe-Line Co., 158 Pa.
366, 26 A. 644 (1893) (Ila: pipeline leak polluted domestic well); Rarick v.
Smith, 17 Pa. County Ct. 627, 5 Pa. Dist. 530 (C.P. 1896) (Ll,3b: dynamite
manufacturing wastes percolated to and polluted stream used for domestic and
livestock water); Vandivort v. Hunter, 265 Pa. 585, 109 A. 479 (1920) (Ali*:
cesspool allegedly polluted domestic spring); Hawk v. Davis, 76 Pa. Super. 565(1921) (Alb: cesspool polluted domestic spring); Lynch v. Jefferson Township
School Dist., 6 Pa. D. & C. 343 (C.P. 1924) (Dic: school privy polluted domestic
well); Schroll v. George Brown's Sons, Inc., 41 Lanc. Law. Rev. 297 (Pa. C.P.
1928) (Llc: dye wastes from cesspool polluted domestic spring); Matthews v.
Plum Township & School Dist., 152 Pa. Super. 544, 33 A.2d 38 (1943) (MRlc:
creosote and manure on road polluted domestic well). ,
Pennsylvania abandoned the common law nuisance rule in 1954 and since
has followed the RESTATEMENT rule.
TENNESSEE: Lytton v. Steward, 2 Tenn. Ch. 586 (1876) (Dle: university
sewage discharged into natural sink allegedly would pollute domestic spring and
well); Reid v. Memphis Memorial Park, 5 Tenn. App. 105 (1927) (Qle: ceme-
tery allegedly would pollute domestic well).
TEXAS: Jung v. Neraz, 71 Tex. 396, 9 S.W. 344 (1888) (Qlc: cemetery seepage
allegedly would pollute domestic well); Dunn v. Austin, 77 Tex. 139, 11 S.W.
1125 (1889) (Qle: cemetery seepage allegedly would pollute domestic well);
Elliott v. Ferguson, 37 Tex. Civ. App. 40, 83 S.W. 56 (1904) (Qlij: cemetery
allegedly would pollute domestic well); Elliott v. Ferguson, 101 Tex. 317, 107
S.W. 51 (1908), rev'g 103 S.W. 453 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907) (Oli*: same facts
as above); Farb v. Theis, 250 S.W. 290 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923) (Qli: cemetery
allegedly would pollute groundwater tributary to stream rendering stream
unpotable); Continental Oil Co. v. Berry, 52 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932)(Jli*: service station gasoline leak polluted domestic well); Jones v. Highland
Memorial Park, 242 S.W.2d 250 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) (Qle: cemetery seepage
allegedly would pollute domestic well); Eternal Cemetery Corp. v. Tammen,
324 S.W.2d 562 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) (Qle: cemetery seepage allegedly would
pollute well).
WASHINGTON: Hite v. Cashmere Cemetery Ass'n, 158 Wash. 421, 290 P. 1008
(1930) (Qle: cemetery seepage allegedly would pollute domestic well); Haveman
v. Beulow, 36 Wash. 2d 185, 217 P.2d 313 (1950) (Llab: potato processing
wastes discharged into pit polluted domestic well); Clark v. Sunset Hills Memorial
Park, 45 Wash. 2d 180, 273 P.2d 645 (1954) (Qle: cemetery seepage might
pollute domestic well).
WISCONSIN: Anstee v. Monroe Light & Fuel Co., 171 Wis. 291, 177 N.W. 26(1920) (Kla: gas plant residues discharged into abandoned sewer polluted domes-
tic well); Enders v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 220 Wis. 254, 263 N.W. 568 (1935), motion
for rehearing denied, 265 N.W. 67 (1936) (Jle: service station gasoline leak
allegedly polluted domestic well).
[Vol. 39
HeinOnline  -- 39 Mo. L. Rev. 154 1974
GROUNDWATER POLLUTION
ENGLAND: Norton v. Scholefield, 152 Eng. Rep. 281 (Ex. 1842) (Ali: cess-
pool polluted domestic well); Turner v. Mirfield, 34 Beav. 390, 55 Eng. Rep.
685 (Rolls 1865) (L7b: wool washings discharged into old coal pit percolated
into coal mine); Fletcher v. Rylands, L.R. 1 Ex. 265 (Ex. Ch. 1866) (dictum);
Womersley v. Church, 17 L.T.R.(n.s.) 190 (Rolls 1867) (Alb: cesspool polluted
domestic well); Millington v. Griffiths, 30 L.T.R.(n.s.) 65 (C.P. 1874)(Kla:
gas plant residues polluted domestic well); Ballard v. Tomlinson, 29 Ch. D.
115 (C.A. 1885), rev'g 26 Ch. D. 194 (1884)(D5ab: factory privy wastes
discharged into sewage well polluted brewery well); Paine & Co., v. St. Neota
Gas & Coke Co., [1939] 3 All E.R. 812 (C.A.), affg [1938] 4 All E.R. 592
(K.B.) (K5a: gas plant ammonia wastes polluted malt works well).
CANADA: Swan v. Adams, 23 Grant Ch. 220 (Ont. 1876) (H1,5i: oil refinery
wastes in disposal pit polluted domestic and tannery springs); Hubbs v. Prince
Edward County, 8 D.L.R.2d 394 (Ont. 1957) (R1,5ab: sand and salt mixture
for de-icing roads polluted domestic and commercial well); British Am. Oil Co.
v. Burrill, [1942] Que. K.B. 218 (C.A.) (J1,6a: service station gasoline leak
polluted domestic well and caused odors in house).
E. Restatement Rule
Listed below are cases applying the rule described in RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 822 (1939) to pollution of percolating groundwater.
MONTANA: Nelson v. C & C Plywood Corp., 154 Mont. 414, 465 P.2d 314
(1970) (LIa: plywood glue wastes discharged into drainage ditch or sump
percolated to and polluted domestic well with phenols).
PENNSYLVANIA: Waschak v. Moffat, 379 Pa. 441, 109 A.2d 310 (1954); Burr
v. Adam Eidemiller, Inc., 386 Pa. 416, 126 A.2d 403 (1956) (N1,5a: slag seep-
age polluted domestic and resort spring); Reinhart v. Lancaster Area Refuse
Authority, 201 Pa. Super. 614, 193 A.2d 670 (1963) (Nla: sanitary landfill
seepage polluted domestic well); Gessner v. Ditzler, 37 Northumb. L.J. 119 (Pa.
C.P. 1965) (Ald: toilet seepage pit polluted domestic well).
F. Abnormally Dangerous Substances Rule
Listed below are cases imposing strict liability for the escape of abnormally
dangerous substances to pollution of percolating groundwater.
ALABAMA: Killian v. Killian, 175 Ala. 224, 57 So. 825 (1912) (Ele: mine
drainage allegedly polluted domestic spring).
ILLINOIS: Ottawa Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Graham, 28 Ill. 73 (1862) (Kla: gas
plant gas leak polluted domestic well); Ottawa Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Graham,
35 Ill. 346 (1864) (by implication) (Kla: same facts as above); Decatur Gas
Light & Coke Co. v. Howell, 92 Ill. 19 (1879) (Klk: gas plant leak polluted
domestic well); Belvidere Gaslight & Fuel Co. v. Jackson, 81 Ill. App. 424 (1898)(KIa: gas plant gas leak polluted domestic well).
KANSAS: Hall v. Galey, 126 Kan. 699, 271 P. 319 (1928) (G1,3,4a: gas well
salt water polluted domestic livestock and irrigation well); Martin v. Shell
Petroleum Corp., 133 Kan. 124, 299 P. 261 (1931) (Gl,3,5a: oil well salt water
polluted domestic, livestock and irrigation well-statutory strict liability); Berry
v. Shell Petroleum Co., 140 Kan. 94, 33 P.2d 953 (1934), rehearing denied, 141
Kan. 6, 40 P.2d 359 (1985) (Gla: oil well salt water discharged into drainage
canal percolated to and polluted domestic well-statutory strict liability); Rusch
v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 163 Kan. 11, 180 P.2d 270 (1947) (G3c: oil well salt
water discharged into slush ponds percolated to fresh water aquifer and polluted
livestock well and spring-statutory strict liability); Reiserer v. Murfin, 183 Kan.
597, 331 P.2d 313 (1958) (GI,3c: salt water from improperly cased oil well
polluted domestic and livestock well-statutory strict liability).
MARYLAND: Yommer v. McKenzie, 255 Md. 220, 257 A.2d 138 (1969) (Jla:
service station gasoline leak polluted domestic Well-REsTATEMENT OF TORTS
§ 520 (1939)).
MASSACHUSETTS: Mears v. Dole, 135 Mass. 508 (1883) (Rlab: removal of
beach caused sea water to percolate into domestic well).
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MINNESOTA: Berger v. Minneapolis Gaslight Co., 60 Minn. 296, 62 N.W. 386
(1895) (KIa: gas plant fuel oil seepage polluted domestic well).
OKLAHOMA: Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Blubaugh, 187 Okla. 198, 102 P.2d 168
(1940) (G~e: salt water from plugged oil well allegedly polluted livestock well).
PENNSYLVANIA: Jackson v. United States Pipe Line Co., 325 Pa. 436, 191 A.
165 (1987) (Ila: pipeline leak polluted domestic well-statutory strict liability);
Bumbarger v. Wa er, 193 Pa. Super. 301, 164 A.2d 144 (1960) (Ela: mine
drainage percolated through strata disturbed by blasting and polluted domestic
well).
SOUTH DAKOTA: Watson v. Great Lakes Pipeline Co., 85 S.D. 310, 182
N.W.2d 314 (1970) (HIa: petroleum tank farm seepage polluted domestic well-
RESTATEMErNT OF TORTS §§ 519-20 (1939)).
TEXAS: Texas Co. v. Giddings, 148 S.W. 1142 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912) (Ii,3a:
pipeline leak polluted domestic and livestock well); Gulf Oil Co. v. Alexander,
291 S.W.2d 792 (Tex. Civ. App.), aff'd per curiam, 156 Tex. 455, 295 S.W.2d
901 (1956) (G4a: oil well salt water in disposal pit polluted irrigation well).
ENGLAND: Hipkins v. Birmingham & Staffordshire Gas Light Co., 5 H. & N.
74, 157 Eng. Rep. 1106 (Ex.), aff'd, 6 H. & N. 250, 158 Eng. Rep. 108 (Ex. Ch.
1860) (KIa: gas plant residues polluted domestic well-statutory strict liability).
G. Theory Not Stated
Listed below are cases involving pollution of percolating groundwater where
the decisional theory is not stated.
ALABAMA: Pan American Petroleum Co. v. Byars, 228 Ala. 372, 153 So. 616
(1934) (Qlj*: service station gasoline leak polluted domestic well).
KANSAS: Spencer v. Derby Oil Co., 140 Kan. 657, 87 P.2d 991 (1934) (Ii,3a:
oil pipeline leak polluted domestic and livestock well); Martin v. Continental Oil
Co., 141 Kan. 37, 39 P.2d 917 (1935) (G1,8f: oil well- salt water discharged into
drainage canal polluted domestic and livestock well); Alliston v. Shell Petroleum
Corp., 143 Kan. 327, 55 P.2d 396 (1936)( Gl,a: oil well salt water injected
underground polluted domestic and livestock well); Augustine v. Hinnen, 201
Kan. 710, 443 P.2d 354 (1968) (GSa: oil well salt water injected underground
polluted livestock well).
MINNESOTA: Sandstone Spring Water Co. v. Kettle River Co., 122 Minn. 510,
142 N.W. a85 (1913)(L2a: creosote discharged into broken sewer polluted
bottled water works well).
MISSOURI: Windle v. Springfield, 820 Mo. 459, 8 S.W.2d 61 (1928), trans-
ferred from 275 S.W. 585 (Spr. Mo. App. 1925) (B5a: city sewage discharged
into cave polluted spring and lake and caused odors).
OHIO: Krazeweski v. Berea, 21 Ohio C.C.R.(n.s.) 449, 33 Ohio C.C. Dec. 878
(1906) (B6c: sewer leak percolated into house cellar).
OKLAHOMA: Darby Petroleum Corp. v. Mason, 176 Okla. 138, 54 P.2d 1046
(1936) (G,8a: oil well salt water polluted domestic and livestock well and
poisoned soil); Shell Oil Co. v. Blubaugh, 199 Oka. 353, 185 P.2d 959 (1947)
(G~j: salt water and refuse from plugged oil well polluted livestock well); D-X
Sunray Oil Co. v. Billue, 361 P.2d 212 (Okla. 1961) (Jik: service station gasolineleak polluted domestic well).
PENNSYLVANIA: Carson v. Bromley, 184 Pa. 549, 39 A. 1115 (1898) (Mle:
stable seepage allegedly polluted domestic well); Wahl v. Methodist Episcopal
Cemetery Ass'n, 197 Pa. 197, 46 A. 913 (1900) (Qie: cemetery seepage allegedly
would pollute domestic well); Moyer v. Boehringer, 13 Berk Co. L.J. 77 (Pa. C.P.
1920) (Ali: cesspool allegedly polluted domestic well).
TEXAS: Beaty v. Abilene, 458 S.W.2d 496 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970) (Nle: sanitary
landfill allegedly would pollute underground water).
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